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Abstract
During the defense expansion in the 1950s and 1960s, along with the renewed expansion in the
1980s, the acquisitions environment in the United States experienced a series of significant
breaches of the ethical standards established for government contracting. These violations in
procurement legislation have led to important additions to the body of case law that governs
procurement policy in the United States and sets the tone for the culture of ethics in all
transactions involving the federal government. This study of federal court cases and legislative
elements addresses these issues and analyzes both the effect these violations have on the
acquisitions environment and the effectiveness of the legislative measures implemented in
response to ethical transgressions. The work will conclude with an analysis of the accountability
present in the system and the outlook for the prevention of ethical breaches in the future.

Introduction
By analyzing the effect ethics violations in government contracting have on the acquisition
environment, general trends in the system can be discerned through the case law, statutes, and
regulations that result from such ethical transgressions. This basis of common law, legislation,
and regulatory measures forms the mechanism through the state of ethical compliance in the U.S.
acquisition system may be examined. The analysis begins with the Cold War era and moves
forward into the present, looking at case law concerning violators of Anti-Kickback legislation,
the U.S. anti-bribery legislation codified in Section 201 of Title 18 of the United States Code,
and other laws that prohibit unethical behavior by public officials or by those who enjoy privity
of contract with the federal government.
5

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Congress increasingly recognized the incredibly
detrimental impact that bribery, gratuities, kickbacks, and fraud perpetrated in the course of the
federal procurement process actually had on government operations. Taxpayer interests are not
well-served when public funds are illegally used for personal gain, and so the legislature drafted
and passed the Anti-Kickback Act in 1946. With the ability to impose both civil and criminal
penalties upon those found guilty of violations, the Anti-Kickback Act was a powerful piece of
acquisition legislation and, after multiple revisions and amendments, continues to be effective
even into the twenty-first century. During the remainder of the 1940s, and into the 1950s and
1960s, the most significant judicial opinions resulting from the commission of ethical violations
concerned the issue of intent, both criminal and legislative. At each of the appellate and
Supreme Court levels, federal courts consistently found that one need only have the intent to
commit bribery to be guilty under the statute, meaning that a bribe may not need to be paid or
received to establish guilt. The concept that intent may be inferred from action in bribery cases
clearly illustrates the government‟s highly antagonistic stance toward this type of ethical
transgression. This sentiment was echoed within other court decisions, which tended to focus on
the legislative intent behind the construction of statutes like the Anti-Kickback Act and the
federal bribery statutes at 18 U.S.C. § 201, thus allowing for broader application of their
provisions and penalties.
With the dawn of the 1970s came a dramatic increase in the number of highly publicized ethical
breaches committed by Washington‟s public officials, culminating in the Watergate scandal and
President Nixon‟s resignation in August of 1974. Just three weeks later, the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy Act was passed, establishing the Office of Federal Procurement Policy as a
major source of guidance and direction in the acquisition environment. This attitude of reform
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was also evident in the 1981 passage of the first of three executive orders, all entitled “Integrity
and Efficiency in Federal Programs.” Along with the 1989 President‟s Commission on Federal
Ethics Law Reform, the President‟s Council on Integrity and Efficiency established by these
executive orders sought to increase economy and efficiency in federal programs and operations
by curbing fraud, waste, and abuse. The 1989 Federal Ethics Reform Act also attempted to
reform the climate of ethical compliance in the federal government, and was relatively successful
in strengthening the ethical measures already in place and improving transparency in the system.
Another focus of the federal government during the 1980s and 1990s was on the use of
commissions, committees, and reviews to detect the vulnerabilities present in the acquisition
system and devise recommendations for legislative or regulatory solutions. With the defense
expansion of the 1980s, the federal government found itself dealing with increased instances of
bribery, graft, and fraud, resulting in a desire to utilize more of the commercial best practices
established for use in the private sector.
With the transition from the 1980s to the 1990s came a new sense of what it meant to be a public
official, with several key cases hinging on the issue of the exact definition of the term “public
official” under Title 18 of the United States Code. As the nation moved from a system in which
contractors maintained distant and egocentric relationships with the government to a more
cooperative system in which contractors often collaborate with the government, the gap between
private employee and public official decreased significantly.

Here again, the government

illustrated its extreme hostility toward the practice of ethical noncompliance, for appellate courts
consistently interpreted legislation to the effect that an individual need not actually be employed
by the government to be considered to occupy a position of public trust and responsibility. This
conclusion is highly reminiscent of the issue concerning the requirement of criminal intent under
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federal bribery legislation, and indicates a certain measure of consistency throughout the
evolution of common law perspectives on ethical breaches in modern federal acquisitions. The
recurring themes that thus appeared in the federal acquisition environment in the years following
the Second World War have continued to endure through the first decade of the twenty-first
century, and portend the development of further sea changes in ideas about ethicality in the
public sector.

United States of America v. Charles V. Labovitz and Martin Abrams; Martin
Abrams, Appellant
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
251 F.2d 393. Jan. 13, 1958
In a set of circumstances that often recurs within the U.S. acquisition system, the Department of
the Army awarded a supply contract that by 1958 found itself at the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. The litigation revolved around a complex issue, the crux of which
concerned the issue of criminal intent as it pertains to the federal bribery statute codified in
Section 201 of Title 18 of the United States Code. The Army contracted with the corporation for
a set number of items under a fixed price contract, allowing for a price redetermination clause
that could be implemented based on costs incurred by the contractor during work on the contract.
When renegotiating this price adjustment, the contracting officer made the determination that,
under the terms of the contract‟s price redetermination clause, the government was entitled to a
refund from the contractor of approximately $16,000.

The contractor responded to the

government‟s calculations by asking leave to represent a more thorough accounting of their costs
for the contract in the hopes of reducing the amount owed. The president of the contracting
8

company, Charles V. Labovitz, along with Martin Abrams, conspired together to bribe a
government accountant in an effort to induce him to submit a favorable recommendation to the
contracting officer and in doing so reduce the amount owed to the government.
The government made no claim that, had the bribery not occurred, the government accountant
might actually have lawfully and factually concluded that his recommendation to the government
should allow for a reduction in the government‟s refund claim. Moreover, the court found that
there was no credible evidence as to whether the contractor‟s proposed supplementary
submission could actually make a legal or factual case for reduction of the refund claim. In fact,
the trial judge made a statement as to the significance of the intent behind the violation. In
charging the jury with their instructions at trial, the district court judge specifically emphasized
that at the core of the bribery charge is the intent to influence an official decision. The issue of
criminal intent here centers not on the success of the act or even on the lawfulness of the
outcome, but rather focuses strictly on the intention to commit the act in violation of the statute
and of well-established public policy. Section 201 of Title 18 of the United States Code is
specific in its condemnation of bribery, clearly stating that the “intent” to influence official acts,
to influence public officials to engage in fraudulent activity, or to induce public officials to
violate their lawful duties, is the at the very core of the violation, and thus must be considered as
a material issue (18 U.S.C. § 201). In order to satisfy the requirements for guilt under the statute,
a defendant must be proven to have either an intention to influence official behavior or an
intention to induce an unlawful action of a public official or an individual considered a public
official for the purposes of the statute [251 F.2d 393 (3rd Cir. 1958)]. In this case the defendants
were shown to have the requisite intent to engage in criminal behavior and so were subject to the
penalties the law prescribes, allowing the Court of Appeals to affirm the decision.
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Interestingly, the court felt it was necessary to include in its opinion a brief explanation of its
rationale for affirming the decision of the district court. Specifically, the court reasoned:
It is a major concern of organized society that the community have the benefit of
objective evaluation and unbiased judgment on the part of those who participate
in the making of official decisions. Therefore, society deals sternly with bribery
which would substitute the will of an interested person for the judgment of a
public official as the controlling factor in official decision[s]. The statute plainly
proscribes such corrupt interference with the normal and proper functioning of the
government. [251 F.2d 393 (3rd Cir. 1958)]
The Court of Appeals went so far as to cite a 1927 case out of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, Daniels v. United States, in which the court determined “that to constitute the offense of
attempted bribery it is immaterial whether the official action sought to be influenced be right or
wrong” [17 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1927)]. The message the 1958 decision was meant to convey
was little different from that of the 1927 decision.

Both courts recognized that bribery,

particularly in government contracting situations, is in direct conflict with public policy, and the
fact that an individual may have violated bribery legislation without actually receiving or
supplying a bribe does not exempt him from guilt. The United States v. Labovitz decision is a
prime example of the type of situation where intent is quite probably as significant a factor as the
factual circumstances of the case and the consequences of the defendant‟s actions. For those
individuals covered under 18 U.S.C. § 201 who choose to violate its provisions, the intent can be
incriminating whether the actual outcome is criminally realized or not.
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Truth in Negotiations Act
Public Law 87-653
Sept. 10, 1962
On September 10, 1962, Congress passed Public Law 87-653, commonly known as the Truth in
Negotiations Act, or TINA. The act, codified by 10 U.S.C. 2306(a) was intended to improve
transparency in an acquisition environment where contractors held significant advantage over the
government. In situations where the procuring agency determines that there is a necessity to
employ sole source procedures, the contractor is in a far more favorable pricing position, for
there is much less motivation to lower prices in the normal competitive fashion. The resulting
inflation of costs passed on to the government in the form of higher prices is precisely the
phenomenon that the Truth in Negotiations Act sought to prevent and rectify. Ultimately, the act
was an attempt to reach a determination of what constitutes a fair and reasonable price in sole
source procurements, and the legislation employed a number of different tactics in this endeavor.
The act established a specific definition of what would be considered cost and pricing data and
gave contractors rules for when they would be required to submit such information. Cost or
pricing data, as defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, is described as follows:
“Cost or pricing data” (10 U.S.C. 2306a(h)(1) and 41 U.S.C. 254b) means all
facts that, as of the date of price agreement or, if applicable, an earlier date agreed
upon between the parties that is as close as practicable to the date of agreement on
price, prudent buyers and sellers would reasonably expect to affect price
negotiations significantly. Cost or pricing data are data requiring certification in
accordance with 15.406-2. Cost or pricing data are factual, not judgmental; and
are verifiable. While they do not indicate the accuracy of the prospective
11

contractor‟s judgment about estimated future costs or projections, they do include
the data forming the basis for that judgment. Cost or pricing data are more than
historical accounting data; they are all the facts that can be reasonably expected to
contribute to the soundness of estimates of future costs and to the validity of
determinations of costs already incurred. (FAR 2.101)
TINA applies to all types of contracts, and is not limited to prime contracts alone, as it includes
subcontracts and contract modifications as well, with subcontract cost or pricing data required
for submission if the amount of the subcontract exceeds 10% of the proposed prime price. The
submission of cost and pricing information is required only in certain situations. The original
legislation under TINA required the submission of cost and pricing data for prime contracts
meeting or exceeding a specified government-wide threshold which was raised from $100,000 to
$500,000 by means of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. The threshold has
since been raised to $550,000, and subsequently to $600,000 and $650,000, though there do exist
certain exceptions to TINA, involving such cases as exist where prices are set by law or
regulation, where adequate price competition has been established, where the procurement
involves commercial items, or where the contract is actually a subcontract for a commercial item
or a modification to an existing contract (FAR 15.403-1(b), United States Agency for
International Development). The act does allow for exceptions even when the acquisition does
not meet one of the above criteria through the establishment of provisions for TINA waivers,
which absolve the contractor of the responsibility for cost and pricing data submission regardless
of the prime contract‟s expected price. The act also specifies that the government maintains
audit rights, and with this broad ability to examine contractor records, the passage of this act
brought the government closer to a balance of power with contractors in the acquisition
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environment of the early Cold War era. The section on Government Responsibility within the
Federal Acquisition Regulation states that, “[i]f, before agreement on price, the contracting
officer learns that any cost or pricing data submitted are inaccurate, incomplete, or not current,
the contracting officer shall immediately bring the matter to the attention of the prospective
contractor, whether the defective data increase or decrease the contract price” (FAR 15.4071(a)).
Perhaps the most essential part of the act is the requirement that all cost and pricing data
submitted be certified as current, accurate, and complete by the contractor. Such certification as
is submitted under TINA must be submitted as soon as practicable after the contractor and the
government reach agreement on the final contract price, as is required by the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR Table 15-2). Also according to the FAR, certification of cost and pricing data
applies only to data upon which contractors base their decisions and make their judgments, not to
the accuracy of the judgments themselves (FAR 15.406-2). More significantly, TINA provisions
specify that a contractor‟s responsibility for the submissions to be current, accurate, and
complete is distinct from and not negated by a lack of personal knowledge that these
requirements were not met, so that ignorance is not considered a defense to TINA violations.
Thus, it is common practice for contractors to conduct a sweep of all records pertaining to the
contract just prior to their final submission of a TINA certificate. During this sweep, which
typically takes place after the agreement on contract price but before official award of the
contract, the contractor reviews its records to determine if the cost and pricing data to be
submitted to the government needs to be amended or updated. Covering factual data existing
and available prior to the agreement on the final contract price, information turned over to the
government as a result of a contractor‟s sweep is that which would have otherwise had an impact
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on the price, whether an increase or a decrease, and is that which was previously unknown to at
least one of the parties. Although sweeps are not an absolute government requirement, they are
of substantial benefit to the contractor, allowing for the submission of cost or pricing data all the
way up to the time the certificate is submitted and providing a final opportunity to correct
mistakes or oversights that could potentially lead to costly TINA violations. In the event that a
contractor is found noncompliant with the provisions of TINA, it is said to be guilty of defective
pricing, for which five points must be established:
1.

The information in question must fit the definition of cost and pricing data
as defined by TINA;

2.

Current, accurate, and complete data must have existed and been
reasonably available to the contractor before the contract price was agreed
upon;

3.

Current, accurate, and complete data must not have been submitted or
disclosed to the contracting officer or one of the authorized representatives
of the contracting officer and these individuals must not have had actual
knowledge of such data or its significance to the proposal;

4.

The government must have relied on the defective data in negotiating with
the contractor; and

5.

The government‟s reliance on the defective data must have caused an
increase in the contract price. (Muskopf, 2006)

Over the years, the Truth in Negotiations Act experienced a series of revisions and updates that
provided further guidance and specifications regarding defective pricing.

The Defense

Authorization Act for the 1986 fiscal year (FY86) added a requirement that contractors be
14

charged interest on the portion of government payments found to be in excess of what the
contractor would have received had the correct cost and pricing data been submitted. In the
FY87 Defense Authorization Act, TINA was amended to establish the government‟s nonreliance on cost or pricing data as a legitimate defense to defective pricing, meaning that, if the
nondisclosure of required information had no effect on the actual amount of the government‟s
payments to the contractor, then the contractor could not be prosecuted for defective pricing.
Moreover, the same authorization act established unacceptable defenses to defective pricing,
including such conditions as appear in sole source procurements or where a superior bargaining
position exists, where a contracting officer should have known of the defective pricing, where an
agreement was reached on the basis of total costs, or where a certificate was never submitted at
all. These defenses may not be used for any reason as a negation of responsibility for defective
pricing under TINA, and as such, they provide considerable strength to the position of the
government in defective pricing disputes. Further Defense Authorization Acts, such as the FY87
Defense Authorization Act and the FY88 Defense Authorization Act, gave a specific definition
to the term “cost or pricing data,” which also lent strength to TINA‟s many provisions
concerning the treatment of this type of data. In the 1990s, developments such as those of the
Federal Acquisition Reform Act had the opposite effect on TINA, weakening the legislation‟s
power to preserve the government‟s rights to transparency and curb the contractor‟s ability to
leverage cost data into elevated profits. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, however, it
seems that the system has reverted back to reflect the attitudes of the 1980s, favoring the
government and its right to make informed decisions about the costs associated with major
procurements. (Muskopf, 2006)
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In 2001, the Department of Defense Investigator General issued “Contracting Officer
Determinations of Price Reasonableness When Cost or Pricing Data Were Not Obtained,” an
audit report which concluded that contracting officers failed to require data in 32% of contracting
actions reviewed and that many of the exceptions granted were invalid (Muskopf, Department of
Defense). Further evidence led to conclusions that the documentation submitted in 86% of the
contracting actions reviewed was inadequate to support a positive determination of price
reasonableness, that many items categorized as commercial acquisitions were not challenged by
the acting contracting officer, and that often catalog prices and price lists were accepted without
analysis (Muskopf, 2006). Moreover, in a 2002 Government Accountability Office Report,
“Contract Management: DOD Needs Better Guidance on Granting Waivers for Certified Cost or
Pricing Data,” the Government Accountability Office considered the negative effects that price
inflation in sole source procurements have on the government and recommended that the
Secretary of Defense take specific measures to provide more guidance to contracting
professionals to help clarify which situations would merit an exceptional case TINA waiver,
what type of data and analyses can be used to determine a price when a waiver is granted, and
what types of outside assistance should be obtained (Government Accountability Office, 2002).
These recommendations reflect the general slant toward increased accountability and accuracy of
cost and pricing information as required under TINA, and illustrate the growing concern that
large sole source procurements are particularly vulnerable to overpayment. The next year‟s
Defense Authorization Act established increased restrictions on the circumstances under which a
TINA waiver may be issued, directing that the Head of the Contracting Authority may only issue
waivers upon a determination that the property or services being purchased cannot reasonably be
obtained without issuance of a TINA waiver, the price can be determined reasonable without the
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submission of cost or pricing data as defined under TINA, and there are demonstrated benefits to
the issuance of the waiver. The condition requiring that the acquisition be one which cannot
reasonably be obtained without a waiver is a significant departure from previous requirements
for obtaining waivers under TINA, for before, waivers were granted merely if both the contract
price could be established as reasonable without cost or pricing data and there would be
demonstrated benefits to granting the waiver.

The FY03 Defense Authorization Act also

instituted Congressional Reporting Requirements for TINA waivers granted to contracts priced
over $15 million, including those acquisitions for commercial items. This, too, indicated the
government‟s focus on the TINA waiver as an exception rather than a common practice, and as a
result of the Defense Authorization Acts of FY02 and FY03 in particular, the number of TINA
waivers significantly decreased (Muskopf, 2006). With the FY05 Defense Authorization Act
came more developments in the evolution of TINA, applying further constrictions to the
circumstances under which an exception to cost and pricing data submission requirements may
be made by stating that a TINA exception does not apply to noncommercial modifications of
commercial items with a cost exceeding $500,000 or 5% of the value of the contract in its
entirety, whichever is to be the greater sum. These revisions indicate that the government has a
vested interest in utilizing the provisions of the Truth in Negotiations Act as a means of ensuring
legal compliance and preventing procurement fraud, particularly in large Department of Defense
acquisitions where sole source procurement and limited commercial availabilities increase the
potential for ethical violations. (Muskopf, 2006)

Robert E. Howard, Defendant, Appellant v. United States of America, Appellee
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
17

345 F.2d 126. May 11, 1965
As the decade further progressed, the 1965 decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit affirmed the district court‟s judgment in the trial of Robert E. Howard,
establishing a ruling that had several significant implications for the state of federal ethics
legislation and its effects on government contracting. Howard, of Andover, Massachusetts,
along with Bernard J. Champy, of Methuen, Massachusetts, were indicted for violating the
provisions of the Anti-Kickback Act while functioning as employees of a federal contractor or
subcontractor as defined by 41 U.S.C. § 52. From June 20 to October 20, 1958, Howard worked
as an assistant plant manager for Raytheon Manufacturing Company‟s Andover plant, which at
the time was operating under a cost-reimbursable prime contract to produce Hawk missiles for
the U.S. Army. Champy was the general manager of Champy Construction Company, the
Lawrence, Massachusetts, subcontractor which had taken on the Hawk missile contract through
Raytheon. Coincidentally, Howard was in the process of constructing a home in Andover during
this time, and the legal and ethical quagmire that emerged was a direct result of the conflict
created by Howard‟s failure to separate his personal affairs from his fiduciary duties and
professional responsibilities.
The first count of the indictment alleged that, on multiple occasions, Champy knowingly
provided Howard with labor and building materials through Champy Construction Company,
with the intention that Howard would use these resources in the construction of his new home.
Though the gain was purely personal for Howard, the intention of Champy was to have the items
act as “a fee, commission, gift, gratuity, and compensation” from Champy Construction
Company that would provide “an inducement for awards of subcontracts and orders” from
Raytheon to Champy Construction and an “acknowledgement of subcontracts and awards
18

previously awarded” [345 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1965)]. While this first count was focused on the
actions of Champy, the second count centered on Howard and presented the same allegations
with the adjustment that it was Howard who was charged with knowingly receiving such
materials and labor and in doing so violating the relevant legislation in the federal bribery
statutes (18 U.S.C. § 201).
In Howard‟s appeal to the First Circuit, he contended that the trial court erred in its interpretation
of the Anti-Kickback Act, and asserted that the legislation was presented as a “Caesar‟s wife
law,” alleging that the court allowed the conviction to stand not on a showing of specific
criminal intent but instead on the mere appearance of guilt [345 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1965)]. The
Court of Appeals found that the Anti-Kickback Act holds much the same purpose as the general
federal bribery statute codified at 18 U.S.C. § 201, and therefore concluded that it was based on
the same principles. Howard asserted that there must be a “connection” between the acceptance
of a bribe paid and the goodwill it was designed to procure, but the court returned once more to
the statutory construction of the Anti-Kickback Act, and concluded that the purpose of the act is
the prevent and prohibit payments granted for the purpose of inducing the award of subcontracts,
as was the case in this situation [345 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1965)]. The Court referenced Kemler V.
United States, among others, in concluding that one‟s only motivation for paying or offering to
pay a bribe is the expectation of some consideration therefore, and thus any such individual has
the requisite intention to influence an official decision that constitutes a violation of the federal
bribery legislation at 18 U.S.C. § 201. Using this rationale, the government was thus able to
prove criminal intent for the acts of bribery. If Howard‟s contentions were allowed to stand, then
the indictment would have dissolved, along with the jury charges, and the verdict would be
insupportable. However, the government‟s arguments prevailed and Howard, after being denied
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both an acquittal and a new trial, appealed in an effort to gain a retrial and again was denied.
Overall, the Court of Appeals discerned that the case was composed of but a few critical
elements, and that those elements, when combined, were enough to affirm Howard‟s conviction.
In such a case as this where the parties and contract types were covered under the definitions
listed in the statute and at least one bribe was knowingly paid, the decision to affirm is merely
one in which the court must align the circumstances at hand with the boundaries of contemporary
legislation. [345 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1965)]
The bribe in question in this case may not even have resulted in the award of a contract, but the
very acts of soliciting, providing, or receiving a bribe are so clearly prohibited by the AntiKickback Act that defenses to these ethical violations are not often successful. The decisions
that result from these cases are frequently less important as common-law delineators between
that which is acceptable business practice and that which is a violation of federal legislation and
more important as commentaries on what has been a steady and deeply-ingrained public policy
prohibiting fraud and corruption. Such questions as whether or not a bribe must result in the
intended goodwill, whether the element of criminal intent must be present, whether it matters if
the outcome would have been unchanged regardless of ethical transgressions committed—all are
significant elements of federal bribery legislation and its application to acquisition professionals,
and all are questions that are answered thoroughly through such cases as are discussed here.

United States of America, Appellee v. George A. Bergman, Jr., Appellant
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
354 F.2d 931. Jan. 19, 1966
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In 1966, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down its decision in a
case involving George A. Bergman, Jr., the Post Office Transportation Manager for New York
State from 1952 to 1961, and the Deputy Regional Director for the New York region in 1962.
Bergman resigned from his post in April 1962, at which point he was called before Grand Juries
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. He was asked to give
testimony concerning the federal government‟s investigations into corruption and bribery activity
present among postal employees and mail contractors in the New York region, but when under
oath, Bergman made multiple statements that were proven to be false. Bergman was convicted
on six counts of a seven-count indictment charging perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1621, and
was subsequently sentenced to six one year terms of imprisonment set to run concurrently.
Bergman had multiple contentions upon appeal, none of which the court found sufficiently
convincing. The government was easily able to present evidence of the falsity of Bergman‟s
statements under oath regarding his involvement in the bribery activities under investigation, and
the Court of Appeals found no legal error in the jury‟s reliance on certain prosecutorial evidence.
Such evidence pertained directly to the manner in which Bergman engaged in illegal financial
transactions, which involved an additional party and an apparent lack of cognizance of the
money‟s illegal source. Although the trial court did strike some of the evidence of Bergman‟s
participation in kickback activities, he nevertheless argued that the presentation of this evidence
to the jury tainted his credibility to an unfair extent and was ultimately prejudicial; the Court of
Appeals disagreed. Instructions were given to the jury limiting the points they were legally
allowed to consider in deciding upon a conviction, though the evidence was still recognized as an
important piece of the prosecution‟s case and necessary to prove other counts of the indictment.
In addition to affirming Bergman‟s conviction and sentence, the Court of Appeals astutely
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recognized the principle that, in order to violate anti-kickback legislation, a bribe need not be
paid directly to or by an individual but only be paid for his benefit or at his request. This
distinction is highly significant in a situation such as that of Bergman, who perjured himself with
statements denying the receipt of kickbacks and other questionable income, as well as
association with other individuals suspected of involvement in kickback schemes.

The

application of anti-corruption legislation to those who even indirectly engage in unethical
activities is here again indicative of the willingness of the judiciary system to consistently
reinforce the legislative sector‟s intent to create effective anti-corruption legislation. Yet it is
nonetheless a constant struggle to bring together the three branches of government to cooperate
in the implementation of effective punitive and preventative measures for the impediment of
ethical breaches in government acquisition.

United States of America, Petitioner v. Acme Process Equipment Company
Supreme Court of the United States
385 U.S. 138. Dec. 5, 1966
In perhaps one of the most significant decisions of the period, the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Earl Warren ruled to reverse a 1965 decision of the U.S. Court of Claims involving a
claim filed against the United States by the Acme Process Equipment Company on behalf of
itself and numerous subcontractors.

Acme contended that it was entitled to reasonable

compensation for the costs incurred as a result of a highly problematic 1953 contract with the
Army Ordnance Corps for the manufacture of 2,751 recoilless rifles. Terminated in the summer
of 1954 upon the discovery of an elaborate kickback scheme perpetrated by three Acme
employees, the contract was structured so that the price of each rifle was fixed at a set dollar
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amount, but included a clause for price renegotiation within limits after 30% of the rifles were
delivered. The Government contended that certain contingent-fee arrangements and bribes as
were proven to take place prior to and concurrent with the term of the contract formed a valid
legal basis for the contract‟s termination.

In contrast, Acme argued that because upper

management remained unaware of the illegal activities, the company should not be required to
bear the heavy burdens of termination without the aid of government reimbursement for its
investments.
The case stems from Acme‟s 1952 decision to hire Harry K. Tucker, Jr., and James S. Norris to
establish and manage the company‟s new government contracting division. The two were
responsible for submitting bids, signing government contracts, entering into subcontracting
agreements, and expediting subcontracting operations, all of which gave them virtually unlimited
control over transactions within the government contracting division. However, Tucker was not
under an exclusive employment contract with Acme, and was in fact under the employ of other
firms at the time, all of which was stated in his employment agreement with Acme. One of the
firms with which Tucker consulted was, like Acme, pursuing largely civilian contracts at the
time, and had entered into an entirely common and legal agreement with Tucker under which he
was to receive a commission for sales he procured. The company was All Metals Industries,
Inc., and it would later become a major subcontractor in the contract in dispute in this case with
over one third of the Army rifle contract. During negotiations for the contract, Acme was
represented by Tucker and Norris, though All Metals was allowed to participate due its vested
interest in the outcome. As the low bidder, Acme eventually was granted award of the prime
contract in 1953, with the understanding that the contract price would require government
approval of all subcontracts in excess of $25,000, as was applicable in this case.
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Although this progression of events had heretofore been relatively straightforward for the
concerned parties, Tucker complicated Acme‟s position as a government contractor by entering
into questionable agreements with potential subcontractors while negotiations between Acme
and the Army were still taking place. In these agreements, two separate firms agreed to pay
Tucker a commission on any orders he could procure from Acme, including those subcontracting
agreements necessary for completion of the Army contract. Army contracting officers learned
of these contingent-fee arrangements and informed Acme‟s president Joshua Epstein that one of
his employees was under suspicion of these activities, but the contract was not cancelled at that
time. Meanwhile, Tucker was being paid the solicited kickbacks for awarding subcontracts to
All Metals and the two other companies, but was apparently desirous of a more lucrative
arrangement, prompting an escalation of his involvement. Tucker approached Jack Epstein, who
was employed as the superintendent of Acme‟s main plant and happened to be the son of Acme‟s
president and principal stockholder, and brought Epstein into the scheme. Tucker and Epstein
threatened to cancel All Metals‟ lucrative subcontract with Acme unless All Metals agreed to pay
$25,000 for fictitious consulting services to them through a dummy corporation that Tucker,
Norris, and Epstein set up for this purpose. The bribe was paid, the conspirators discovered and
forced to resign, and the excess cost added to the subcontract price paid by Acme, thus
increasing the cost of Acme‟s prime contract and in turn the final cost to the government.
The Court of Claims, upon examination of Acme‟s claim that it should not be held to account for
the kickback activities of its agents, whether or not those agents were criminally liable, found
that the Anti-Kickback Act did not give the United States the legal right to terminate Acme‟s
prime contract for default and fail to reimburse the company for its significant investments.
Acme claimed the government knew for months that the bribery was occurring and neglected to

24

terminate the contract, thus forfeiting its right to do so. Acme contended that the reason for
termination was, in fact, the growing obsolescence of the weapons ordered in the contract, and
the government‟s desire to cancel the order without the costs associated with a termination for
convenience. As Acme had little experience in government contracting, the firm had always
planned to subcontract out the bulk of the work, leaving only final assembly and finishing for the
main plant to perform. Unfortunately, however, Acme‟s inexperience and poor choices coupled
with various other complications not of the firm‟s own making caused massive cost overruns at
all levels of production.

As the prime contract was a fixed-price with limited price

redetermination contract, Acme was eligible for a price increase of approximately 18% when
30% of the rifles had been successfully produced and accepted.

During production, the

government was aware of the cost increases and, to some extent, the questionable activities of at
least one Acme employee, and waited to cancel the contract until after the offending individuals
had resigned publicly.

The Court of Claims found the government‟s actions in this case

suspicious and worthy of pause, finding in favor of Acme, and holding that the government had
all the knowledge necessary to make its decision about termination in May of 1953 and thus had
no legal basis for waiting until July of 1954 to cancel the contract. The Court also ruled that the
Anti-Kickback Act in its contemporary form could not be said to apply to Acme, making a
highly significant distinction between Acme as the principal and Tucker, Norris, and Epstein as
the agents, and concluding that Acme could not be at fault. The Court reasoned that the civil
remedy imposed in the 1946 Act was sufficient to allow the government to recoup any losses as
a result of bribery, gratuities, and kickbacks in public procurement. Regarding government
claims that conflicts of interest and false claims by Acme would allow for the contract to be
legally voided, the Court ruled again for Acme, finding no legal grounds for termination.
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The United States brought the case before the Supreme Court in 1966, where the question moved
from one of legal technicality to one of legislative intent. The Supreme Court focused on the
potential impact of a policy following the Court of Claims decision, and determined that the
original drafters of the Anti-Kickback Act intended for the legislation to provide both criminal
penalties for violators and civil remedies to recoup lost government funds. In observing the
“decidedly hostile” attitude of the legislation‟s authors toward kickbacks and bribery in general,
the Supreme Court recognized such activities were prohibited because they are in direct
contradiction with U.S. goals to promote an efficient procurement system (385 U.S. 138). The
Supreme Court noted the failure of the Court of Claims to fully consider both the monetary and
nonmonetary costs associated with the commission of acts of bribery in government
procurement. Any kickback or gratuity costs incurred at the subcontracting level are ultimately
passed on to the prime contractor and then the government through higher contract prices and
price redeterminations in both sealed bidding and negotiated contracting situations. However,
the Court of Claims rested on Acme‟s assumption that kickbacks are easily recoverable and can
thus be recouped through the provisions expressly stated in the Anti-Kickback Act.

The

Supreme Court astutely observed that kickbacks and bribery conspiracies are quite often
clandestine operations, and the cost inflation to which they directly contribute is rarely detectable
or easily defined. Cases involving defense contracts are particularly vulnerable to the ethical
violations as they more often require developmental products not readily available on the
commercial marketplace. In these situations, there may be additional opportunities for inflating
bids, for comparison with other comparable contractors can be difficult, and even if the inflated
prices are apparent, the discovery may not be made until after the contract has been awarded,
forcing the government to endure the costs of cancellation and reprocurement. Furthermore, the
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Supreme Court found that Acme‟s argument about the kickback recovery provisions in the AntiKickback Act did not consider the fact that the amount of bribes paid is not necessarily
equivalent to the actual cost incurred by the government (385 U.S. 138). The Court reasoned
that subcontractors paying kickbacks would not only include the price of the bribe in the contract
price charged to the prime contractor, but would also produce elevated contract costs because
they have no incentive to control costs or improve efficiency and quality. Subcontracts obtained
through kickbacks are inherently more costly to the government, for without needing to engage
in fair competition, the subcontractor may inflate its bid in ways that may be virtually
untraceable, especially when competing in the defense sector. Moreover, subcontractors who
obtain contracts by such means create higher risk in the contract through increased potential for
problems in production quality, efficiency, and scheduling, and such issues are often ill-tolerated
on defense contracts such as that held by Acme in this case.
As schemes like the kickback conspiracy engineered by Tucker, Norris, and Epstein pose a
serious problem with very real financial consequences for the government, legislation has been
enacted to provide a means of recovering funds disbursed as kickbacks as well as deter such acts
through punitive mechanisms. The 1946 Anti-Kickback Act created such a civil and criminal
remedy, expressly prohibiting kickbacks to employees of a prime contractor if the contract was
on a cost-plus-fixed-fee or other cost reimbursable basis, as those were the only commonly used
contract types at the time (385 U.S. 138, 142). However, the act did not specifically cover fixed
price contract types such as that used by Acme in this case, and so when Norris, Epstein, and
Tucker were indicted and tried for violation of the Anti-Kickback Act in 1956, all were acquitted
by means of the legal loophole. At trial, the District Court found the defendant‟s actions
“despicable, and morally reprehensible, but unfortunately within the narrow letter of the law”
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[United States v. Norris, Crim. No. 18535 (D.C.E.D. Pa.), April 14, 1956].

The Court

recommended that the law be revised to more appropriately reflect the intentions of the original
drafters, and in 1960, Congress at the behest of the Comptroller General did pass Public Law 86695, allowing for coverage of the Anti-Kickback Act to extend to all negotiated contracts. In
addition, the amendment allowed for retroactive recovery of kickbacks so that even those paid or
incurred by the subcontractor before the act came into effect were subject to recovery by the
federal government. The Anti-Kickback Act remains a powerful piece of acquisition legislation
in its amended form today, particularly after further revisions in 1986 with the passage of Public
Law 99-634. The District Court‟s decision to acquit Tucker, Epstein, and Norris of the charges
laid against them proves the tenuous nature of acquisition ethics during the early cold war era
and the need for legislative reform in a post-war, modern America.

The Supreme Court

specifically acknowledged the 1960 amendments to the Anti-Kickback Act, indicating the
significant fact that acquisition practices had evolved since the 1946 passage of the original
legislation and the necessity for updated language. The Court did, however, emphasize that the
Congressional stance toward bribery, kickbacks, and gratuities has always been one of fervent
opposition, stemming from the logical conclusion that these activities are contrary to the public
good and in direct conflict with societal conceptions of ethical behavior and fiduciary
responsibility.

United States of America v. Albert Solomon Heffler and Donald Joseph Cecchini,
Donald Joseph Cecchini, Appellant
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
402 F.2d 924. Nov. 6, 1968
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Here again, a case hinges on more than one point of law, and an analysis of the circumstances is
not so much a finding-of-fact but rather a fitting-of-fact to the appropriate provision of
legislation. The 1968 case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit centers on the
conviction of Donald Joseph Cecchini on two counts: (1) that he, in conjunction with Albert
Solomon Heffler, formed a conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) and (2) that he committed a
substantive violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) [402 F.2d 924 (3rd Cir. 1968)]. The violations arose
when Heffler attempted to coordinate with Eggart, a manufacturing company, in order to
exchange kickbacks and bribes for assurances that Eggart would be the successful bidder on
various contracts to be awarded by the Air Force Materiel Command. Eggart, however, reported
Heffler‟s scheme to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who began to monitor the situation.
The F.B.I. collected evidence proving that both Heffler and Cecchini visited Eggart, together and
alone, and Eggart testified that during these visits, Cecchini made a significant effort to
exaggerate his authority and influence on the selection of bidder.

At this time, Cecchini

supposedly also solicited bribes for future influence and admitted to doing so at least twice
before. The trial court sentenced Cecchini to two years of imprisonment, with all but 60 days to
be a suspended sentence, and Cecchini appealed to the Third Circuit.
Cecchini‟s defense was that he did not violate the statute, for he was not actually a public official
with the authority to choose the bidder to whom the contract was awarded. However, although
he was not a contracting officer, he was a senior technician, and sometimes an acting chief, of
the Ground Support Equipment Section in the Directorate of Research, Development, and
Engineering at the St. Louis installation of the Army Aviation Materiel Command [402 F.2d 924
(3rd Cir. 1968)]. His expert advice was regularly relied upon when decisions were being made
concerning contractors and their technical evaluations, and thus he qualifies as a public official
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for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 201. The court reasoned that it is irrelevant whether or not
Cecchini actually had the power to make the decision he promised.

Cecchini‟s actual

responsibilities merit some consideration, but overall, the primary factors to consider are the
actions and intent of the offender, and not the individual‟s authority level. The significant role
the element of intent plays in this case is reminiscent of that in the case of United States of
America v. Charles V. Labovitz and Martin Abrams, and illustrates the importance of criminal
intent as it relates to ethical violations in federal government procurement [251 F.2d 393 (3rd Cir.
1958)].

Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act
Public Law 93-400
Aug. 30, 1974

By the early 1970s, the federal government had become increasingly concerned about the state of
economy and efficiency within the agencies of the executive branch. The exposure of various
ethical violations by public officials, culminating in the Watergate scandal and President Nixon‟s
resignation on August 9, 1974, quite obviously had wide-reaching effects throughout the
agencies of the executive branch. One such resultant of this reform-hungry climate of the early
1970s arrived in the form of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974, which
established as an agency within the Office of Management and Budget the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy and mandated that the institution provide guidance and direction in areas
involving the development and application of procurement policy. Charged with duties such as
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the prescription of policies, regulations, forms, and procedures, the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy was given major responsibility to shape the acquisition environment during a
critical time in its evolution. The six administrative functions assigned to the Administrator of
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy illustrate the significant impact the establishment of
this office has had on government procurement policy:
1.

Establishing a system of coordinated uniform procurement regulations for
executive agencies;

2.

Establishing criteria and procedures for an effective method of soliciting
the viewpoints of interested parties in the development of procurement
policies;

3.

Monitoring and revising policies, regulations, procedures, and forms
concerning reliance on the private sector to provide needed property and
services;

4.

Promoting and conducting research in procurement policies, regulations,
procedures, and forms;

5.

Establishing a system for collecting and developing procurement data; and

6.

Recommending programs for recruitment, training, development, and
performance evaluation of procurement personnel. (Office of Federal
Procurement Policy Act, 1974)

The first of these functions gave the Office of Federal Procurement Policy the authority to
develop the most influential body of regulations regarding federal procurement policy. Codified
in Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, or FAR,
serves as the primary source of regulations in the federal acquisition system. Applicable to
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virtually every government agency, the FAR was promulgated in 1984 in an effort to create a
“uniform set of policies and procedures” and decrease the level of inconsistency that had thus far
existed among various agencies (FAR 1.101). Divided into fifty-three numbered parts, the FAR
is organized into eight lettered subchapters, which are each then divided into subparts, sections,
subsections, and subsequent divisions. The FAR‟s various subchapters (General, Competition
and Acquisition Planning, Contracting Methods and Contract Types, Socioeconomic Programs,
General Contracting Requirements, Special Categories of Contracting, Contract Management,
and Clauses and Forms) contain provisions regarding such topics as Part 3: “Improper Business
Practices and Personal Conflicts of Interest;” Part 13: “Simplified Acquisition Procedures;” Part
14: “Sealed Bidding;” and Part 15: Contracting by Negotiation.” Though government agencies
are allowed to develop supplements to the FAR, no provision within a supplement may
contradict the terms and conditions set forth with the bounds of the FAR. Here again the
government makes an effort to implement measures to increase economy, efficiency, and
ethicality. Even through its statements of vision for the U.S. acquisition system as they are laid
out in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the government maintains its emphasis on minimizing
operating costs, fulfilling public policy objectives, and conducting business with integrity,
fairness, and openness (FAR 1.102(b)).

James Slater, Defendant-Appellant v. United States of America, Appellee
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
562 F.2d 58. Dec. 22, 1976
Although many of the federal government‟s actions in pursuit of economy, efficiency, and
ethicality in the 1970s were meant to be more generalized in order to allow for greater extension
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of use, in some cases, the generalities built into the laws prohibiting certain types of ethical
violations did become a point of contention in the judicial branch when a singular set of
circumstances once again raised the familiar question of legislative intent. In a 1969 agreement
with the City of Boston, the federal government agreed to pay for one hundred percent of the
grants and eighty percent of the administration costs for a new Model Cities program, to be run
by the City of Boston in an effort to help make more grants available to low-income homeowners
who wished to repair their homes (42 U.S.C. § 3301). The program necessitated that someone be
in charge of inspecting the work of contractors hired for repairs, and in this case, that individual
was James Slater. Slater was given various responsibilities, and he had the authority to stop
work on a project if he was unsatisfied with the work being performed. He also had control over
the issuance of progress payments, which, if delayed significantly, could seriously impact a
contractor, and he had the power to make it difficult for contractors to get further jobs under the
Model Cities program if he wished to do so. At a certain point in August of 1971, the Model
Cities administration had agreed to pay a contractor $5,000 for repair work on a home. Slater
took the contractor to the site and inquired as to whether the work could perhaps be completed
for $4,500 and the remaining $500 given to Slater as a kickback. The contractor agreed and paid
Slater $300 at the time of the first progress payment. Slater was subsequently convicted of two
counts of conspiring to defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and violating the AntiKickback Act under 18 U.S.C. § 874. He appealed both convictions to the Court of Appeals,
with the arguments that the Anti-Kickback Act is inapplicable, and that even if it is applicable,
that the two statutes contradict one another and thus he cannot be convicted on both.
The court thoroughly examined the breadth of the Anti-Kickback Act, and found that its
generalities, though useful in allowing for the prosecution of those would exploit legal loopholes,
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do demand a close inspection of who should be covered under the act as is judged by original
legislative intent. Because Slater never actually had an employment relationship with the federal
government and was technically an independent contractor, he was, thus, not considered covered
under the Anti-Kickback Act‟s mandates. Once the court had stricken the count relating to the
Anti-Kickback Act violation, Slater‟s complaint about conflicting convictions was of negligible
merit, though the court does take the time to recognize the unique scope of the Anti-Kickback
Act and the potential it may have to contradict some other piece of legislation in a set of
hypothetical circumstances. On December 22, 1976, the Court of Appeals vacated Slater‟s
sentence. The original sentence was imposed for both counts together, and as the Court of
Appeals could not discern the weight given to each count at sentencing, it felt compelled to
vacate and remand for resentencing under the only remaining conviction, which was that for
conspiracy to commit bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 371. This case is significant in that it represents
the dilemma that can arise when the Congressional intent behind an article of legislation is
questionable or open to interpretation, as some would argue that it is when such a broad statute
as the Anti-Kickback Act is enacted with deliberate generalities in place.

Integrity and Efficiency in Federal Programs
Executive Orders 12301, 12625, and 12805
Mar. 26, 1981; Jan. 27, 1988; and May 11, 1992
On March 26, 1981, President Reagan signed into law Executive Order 12301, establishing as an
interagency committee the President‟s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE). The order, in
keeping with what was rapidly becoming the federal government‟s mantra, was an attempt to
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prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in government programs and operations, and thus the
order listed several specific functions to be carried out by council members. Firstly, the council
was charged with the development of plans for coordinated activities spanning the entire breadth
of federal agencies, and ensuring that those activities be directed at the problems of fraud and
waste in government systems. Next, the order required that the council develop coordinated
relationships between federal, state, and local government agencies, as well as nongovernmental
entities so that there may be cooperation with respect to the promotion of economy and
efficiency. Furthermore, the order mandated the development of standards for the management
and operation of investigator-general-type actions, and required that the council establish policies
to “ensure the development of a corps of well-trained and highly skilled auditors and
investigators” (Woolley, 2010). The interagency audit and investigation programs that result
from this initiative were directed to target problems with fraud, waste, and abuse that were
outside the capability or jurisdiction of a single government agency with efficiency and
effectiveness, which indicate that this order is very much a reaction to the sentiments of other
legislative and judicial efforts of the 1970s and 1980s. Through this executive order, the council
was charged with the implementation of the many coordinated plans, standards, and policies that
they may have the power to conduct and supervise government audits and investigations and
that, as a foremost concern, they “promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the
administration of programs and operations of the [g]overnment, as well as to detect fraud and
abuse in such programs and operations” (Executive Order 12301, 1981). (Woolley, 2010)
However, the provisions of this order did not even remain in effect for the duration of Reagan‟s
Presidency, for on January 27, 1988, he signed into law Executive Order 12625, also entitled
“Integrity and Efficiency in Federal Programs,” thus revoking Executive Order 12301.
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Executive Order 12625‟s changes to Executive Order 12301 included such alterations as the
inclusion of the Deputy Director of the Office of Personnel Management in place of the Director,
and the Associate Attorney General in place of the Deputy Attorney General. Other members of
the council, such as the designee of the Secretary of Defense and the designee of the Director of
the United States International Development Cooperation Agency were deleted from the order‟s
list of required members, and others, such as the Director of the Office of Government Ethics
and the Special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protections Board were added to the group. Other
significant changes included the increased emphasis on the “preeminent” role the Department of
Justice plays in the government‟s struggle against ethical violations and the misuse of
government resources, as well as the specific mention of law enforcement and litigation as
pertains to the functions of the council. (Woolley, 2010)
Yet, again, the order did not stand in effect for long. On May 11, 1992, President H. W. Bush
signed into law the third “Integrity and Efficiency in Federal Programs” order, numbered
Executive Order 12805. This order instituted minor changes in the President‟s Council for
Integrity and Efficiency membership as well, such as adding the Vice Chairperson of the
Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency as a position, as well as seats for the Controller of
the Office of Federal Financial Management, the Associate Deputy Director for Investigations of
the Federal Bureau of Investigations (in place of the Executive Assistant Director of
Investigations), and the Special Counsel of the Office of Special Counsel (in place of the Special
Counsel of the Merit Systems Protections Board). More significantly, however, the order not
only reestablished the President‟s Council on Integrity and Efficiency, but also established a new
inter-entity committee called the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE), which
included many of the same members as hold positions on the President‟s Council on Integrity
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and Efficiency. The executive order maintained the position of the first two orders in that it
charged the councils with the identification and analysis of areas of weakness in the federal
government‟s operations that leave the United States vulnerable to fraud, waste, and
mismanagement of resources. The councils were also charged with the promotion of economy
and efficiency both in ensuring compliance in others and in conducting their own activities. The
role of audits, investigations, and the Department of Justice in enforcement of legal provisions
for preventing government fraud and abuse is again stated to be of critical importance, indicating
the government‟s recognition that in order to increase efficiency, violations must be detected and
prosecuted. With this order, it was mandated that individuals serving on the councils adhere to
the professional standards developed by the councils and participate in their activities, a
requirement which seems to indicate that this responsibility had not heretofore been performed
satisfactorily. Moreover, the order states that the councils may not diminish or interfere with the
scope of authority and responsibility of other agencies, indicating that the level of oversight
authority allowed the President‟s Council on Integrity and Efficiency in the past created conflicts
among governmental agencies. (Woolley, 2010)
Taken as a whole, the three orders on “Integrity and Efficiency in Federal Programs” comprise a
decade‟s worth of efforts at curbing fraud, waste, and abuse within the federal government‟s
programs and operations through the promotion of economy and efficiency at the interagency
level. The measures taken by these councils mark a point at which the public demand for active,
investigative oversight reached new heights, and so, though many of the changes from one order
to another are minor, they are important as representations of the national pressures to
continually improve the government‟s system of detecting, preventing, and prosecuting fraud,
waste, and abuse in government programs and operations.
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Competition in Contracting Act
Public Law 98-369
July 18, 1984
Codified in the United States Code in sections of Titles 10, 31, 40 and 41, the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984, or CICA, was another attempt at fairness on a national level, as it was
intended to level the playing field among federal government contractors, ensuring that all
received equal opportunity to do business with the United States government. The legislation
required that contracts be awarded only through “full and open competition through the use of
competitive procedures” unless otherwise authorized by law (Manuel, 2009, ii). There are
situations in which the law permitted contracts to be awarded without the use of “full and open
competition,” in such circumstances in which approval had been obtained through submission of
justification and approval documents and there existed:
1.

Only one responsible source and no other supplies and services will
satisfy agency requirements;

2.

Unusual and compelling urgency;

3.

Industrial

mobilization;

engineering,

developmental,

or

research

capability; or expert services;
4.

International agreement;

5.

Authorized or required by statute;

6.

National security [concerns]; or

7.

Public interest. (FAR 6.302-1-7; .10 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(1)-(7); 41 U.S.C. §
253(c)(1)-(7).)
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The Competition in Contracting Act also provided for special simplified procedures for
micropurchases, purchases above the micropurchase threshold but below the simplified
acquisition threshold, and purchases of commercial items whose prices fall between the
simplified acquisition threshold and $5.5 million (in most cases). The legislation was passed
based on several assumptions about the benefits the government would reap from increased
competition in contracting, with many of those benefits pertaining to the reduction of fraud and
waste in the acquisition system. Proponents of the act believed that increased competition would
force agencies to use a wider variety of contractors, which would decrease the number of the
blatantly unethical collusive agreements existing in an acquisition system that exhibits a
tolerance for preferential treatment for certain contractors. Further support for the act was based
on the reasoning that competition promotes accountability, as contracts would be awarded based
solely on the merits, and the competitive environment is a positive force in ensuring the public
that tax dollars are not being wasted on elevated contract prices. It is this pressure to maintain
integrity in the expenditure of public funds that drove much of the ethics and procurement
reform during this period. (Manuel, 2009, 1-19)

President’s Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform
Executive Order 12668
Jan. 25, 1989
On January 25, 1989, President H. W. Bush signed the “President‟s Commission on Federal
Ethics Law Reform,” deemed Executive Order 12668. Under this order, a commission was
established to review federal ethics laws, past executive orders, and current policies and then
make recommendations as to the legislative, administrative, and other reforms deemed necessary
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to ensure public confidence in the integrity of the system and of public officials and employees.
As a result of this comprehensive review, the commission submitted its report in March of 1989,
entitled “To Serve with Honor: Report of the President‟s Commission on Federal Ethics Law
Reform.” Recommendations varied across such topics as employment and post-employment
issues, financial disclosure, remedies and enforcement mechanisms, and the structure of federal
ethics regulation. The study was conducted in keeping with several key principles, all of which
maintain the same concern over integrity and efficiency that is so pervasive within the realm of
federal ethics law:
1.

Ethical standards must be exacting enough to ensure that public officials
act with the utmost integrity and fulfill the public's confidence in them;

2.

Standards must be fair and objective;

3.

Standards must be equitable across all three branches of the Federal
Government; and

4.

Standards must not be so unreasonably restrictive that they discourage
able citizens from entering public service. (Gilman, 1995)

This executive order, like other passed around the same time, reflects the government‟s efforts at
becoming more responsible and responsive, holding to higher standards the individuals who
choose to serve as public officials or public employees. This order established reform in such a
way that was not only in keeping with past efforts at improving the government‟s methods of
conducting transactions, but also a foray into developing a performance-driven system that
would have a significant effect on the acquisition environment‟s policies and procedures in
future years.
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Principles of Ethical Conduct for Government Officers and Employees
Executive Order 12674
Apr. 12, 1989
Shortly thereafter, Executive Order 12674 was signed on April 12, 1989, by President H. W.
Bush, directing the Office of Government Ethics to develop a “single, uniform, and
comprehensive set of ethical standards” for the executive branch‟s officers and employees
(Gilman, 1995).

Due partially to the recommendations of the President‟s Commission on

Federal Ethics Law Reform, the Office of Government Ethics issued its final rule promulgating
fourteen standards of conduct for executive branch employees in August of 1992, with the date
of effectiveness some months later on February 3, 1993. Codified in Part 2635 of Title 5 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, the rules were based on previous concepts of appropriate standards
for ethical behavior in government, but attempted to improve upon the previous standards by
consolidating them into a single set for the executive branch rather than separating them by
agency. Before the consolidated standards took effect, each agency still followed its own
standards based on a model rule promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management in 1965.
The new, comprehensive standards utilize a statement of general principles found in Executive
Order 12674 and focus the individual standards on the topics of gifts, conflicting financial
interests, impartiality, employment-seeking, misuse of position, and outside activities. The crux
of the executive order and the standards of ethical conduct that resulted is the government‟s
emphasis on a public trust as a mandate of public office, a concept that has had numerous
applications to case law, and one that has endured within the U.S. acquisition system. Following
the lead of the executive order, the Department of Defense developed the Joint Ethics
Regulation, or JER, which serves as the “single source of standards of ethical conduct and ethics
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guidance, including direction in the areas of financial and employment disclosure systems, postemployment rules, enforcement, and training” (JER 1-100). The promulgation of the JER in
1993 marked a significant step toward creating a more comprehensive set of ethical regulations
and a clearer statement regarding the priority the federal government places on ethical
compliance. (Gilman, 1995)

Ethics Reform Act
Public Law 101-194
Nov. 30, 1989
Signed into law by President George H. W. Bush on November 30, 1989, the Ethics Reform Act
of 1989 was passed largely as a result of the conclusions and Recommendations of the
President‟s Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform and the report of the House Bipartisan
Ethics Task Force. The act was intended to strengthen ethical standards and implement key
reforms, with principal provisions to include such terms as the following: “the extension of postemployment „revolving door‟ restrictions to the legislative branch; a ban on receipt of honoraria
by Federal employees (except the Senate); limitations on outside earned income for highersalaried, noncareer employees in all branches; increased financial disclosure; creation of conflictof-interest rules for legislative branch staff; and limitations on gifts and travel” (Woolley, 2010).
President Bush emphasized his focus on reasonable specificity in the construction of the act, with
the intention that this exactness help ensure that all public officials act in manner that warrants
the public‟s confidence, indicating a national concern that government agencies are all too prone
to fraud and waste. The President also cited his desire for fairness and objectivity, but also
emphasized the importance of using common sense in ethical matters and applying the law
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equally across all branches of the government. This is completely consistent with the concerns
that motivate so much of the legislation passed in the preceding decade, which centered on
improving efficiency through decreased abuse in the system. (Woolley, 2010)
The act made further strides in preventing unethical behavior in government transactions by
amending the federal conflict-of-interest statutes and prohibiting officers and employees of all
three branches from soliciting or accepting gifts from unauthorized sources.

The act also

authorized the supervisory ethics office in each branch of the government to issue regulations to
implement the different provisions and terms, and gave executive branch agencies the
authorization to accept payment from non-federal sources for certain travel expenses. Also, the
act set certain limits on the amount of outside earned income allowable by law and imposed
restrictions on employment terms for covered senior officials in the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government. Though a public financial disclosure system was established
government-wide in 1978 under the Ethics in Government Act, the Ethics Reform Act provided
for an improved system of financial disclosure as well. The system was implemented to bring
more transparency into the system so that the financial interests of public officials would be
subject to more oversight, identifying potential conflicts-of-interest before they become
problematic, allowing remedies to be developed in advance of any real detriment to the public.
This line of thinking was partially a response to the myriad of scandals in government that
occurred in the 1970s, beginning most notably with that of Watergate. The 1978 Ethics in
Government Act established the Office of Government Ethics as a part of the Office of Personnel
Management, and charged the new office with providing leadership and direction for the ethics
program within the executive branch. The act also strengthened post-employment restrictions on
former executive branch officials, hedging against potential conflicts of interest and putting in
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place stronger legislation for the prevention of ethical violations. The Ethics Reform Act of
1989 was also brought about by two other 1978 acts, the Inspector General Act and the Civil
Service Reform Act, both of which enacted important ethics-related provisions. The Inspector
General Act established Offices of Inspector General within certain executive branch
departments and agencies and gave those institutions the responsibility and autonomy necessary
to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and mismanagement within the federal government. The
Civil Service Reform Act established the Merit Systems Protection Board, which was charged
with the oversight of executive branch personnel practices as well as the integrity of the federal
merit systems. The legislation also included significant provisions regarding the treatment of
those who make lawful disclosures of abuse or mismanagement and enlarged the functions and
authorities of the Merit Systems Protection Board‟s Office of Special Counsel to deal with the
new responsibilities; subsequent acts such as the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 instituted
further protections for similar situations. Other legislation passed during the same time period,
including the Federal Managers‟ Financial Integrity Act of 1982, focused on internal and
administrative controls, more effective auditing measures, and increased efficiency, all with
central concerns of curbing unnecessary costs and decreasing the size of individual budgets. The
Office of Government Ethics Reauthorization Act of 1988 marks a significant point in ethics
legislation, for with this legislation, the Office of Government Ethics was separated from the
umbrella of the Office of Personnel Management, establishing it as a separate executive agency
in order to ensure the effectiveness of the ethics program within the executive branch of the
federal government as well as to clarify the mandate of the Office of Government Ethics and
increase the agency‟s stature, independence, and effectiveness. Also in that same year, Congress
passed the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1988, which sought to
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increase integrity in acquisitions. The procurement provisions dealt with the areas of postemployment restrictions, the seeking of employment, gratuities, and information disclosure, and
the act specifically designated that, excepting the case of post-employment restrictions, the
provisions extend to not only officers and employees, but also contractors, subcontractors,
consultants, advisors, and experts who may act on behalf of or provide advice to an agency
regarding an agency procurement. This clearly relates back to the issue of delineation between
what does and does not constitute a duty to act with the responsibility of a public official, which
is a common point of contention in procurement fraud cases. (Gilman, 1995)

Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act
Public Law 103-355
Oct. 13, 1994
Further legislation continued to promote the government‟s philosophy of cost-reduction and
greater effectiveness among the agencies of the executive branch. Signed into law on October
13, 1994 by President Clinton, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) was intended to
eliminate some of the waste in the acquisition system through a series of new regulations
implemented to facilitate the procurement of commercial items. The government‟s preference
for commercial items is well-established, as is the positive impact that increased use of
simplified acquisition procedures has on contract costs. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining
Act responded to the government‟s drive to reduce costs and curb waste, altering contemporary
legislation in several primary ways. First, FASA established that a contract must not only fall
short of the simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000 but must also receive the correct
authorization to implement simplified acquisition procedures. Such authorization was to depend
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upon the procuring agency‟s implementation of the Federal Acquisition Computer Network, or
FACNET, the usage of which determined where the acquisition must be publicized and to which
thresholds the contracting agency must adhere. The legislation allowed for greater freedom for
contracting officers in that it allowed for the use of new approaches for the awarding of contracts
using simplified acquisition procedure, opening up FAR Parts 14, “Sealed Bidding,” and Part 15,
“Contracting by Negotiation,” as potential avenues for adaptation. Previously, the simplified
acquisition procedures outlined in Part 13 were the only ones available for use, so this
development indicates a willingness to loosen restrictions in order to allow for expedited and
abbreviated acquisitions. Furthermore, FASA established that acquisitions falling below the
simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000 but above the micro-purchase threshold of $2,500
be reserved for small businesses, excepting certain sets of circumstances involving such
situations as arise with required sources of supply or sole source procurements. Also, FASA
abolished the rule that allowed the use of small business, small purchase set-asides for contracts
awarded to small non-manufacturers for the sale of domestically-produced or manufactured
products. The act further instituted regulations requiring that acquisitions priced between the
micro-purchase threshold and the simplified acquisition threshold be reserved for small
businesses, as well as mandating that the products must be furnished by a small business
manufacturer in all cases except those where the Small Business Administration grants a special
waiver of the requirement. (United States Department of Labor)
Implementation of certain FASA requirements, such as those concerning the authorization to use
simplified acquisition procedures, was not as effective as the legislation‟s drafters had hoped, as
is evinced by a Letter Report of the General Accounting Office from January of 1997, just over
two years after FASA was signed into law. The report, entitled, “Acquisition Reform: Obstacles
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to Implementing the Federal Acquisition Computer Network,” relays the findings of the
Government Accountability Office pertaining to the government‟s progress in implementing
FACNET for use in procurements across all agencies. The report concluded that the difficulties
of doing business through the FACNET system have overshadowed the cost-curbing benefits
originally expected to result from the new system, and alleged that the approach to the system,
which was supposed to facilitate lower prices and better access to vendors, was not correctly
synced with the most current cost-effective technologies and buying practices.

Individual

agencies also conducted analyses of the effectiveness of FACNET in reaching its goals for cost
reduction and alignment with simplified acquisition policies and procedures, which reached the
conclusion that the use of FACNET for contracts priced at or below a $25,000 threshold often
resulted in a need for greater time and resources than if traditional simplified purchasing methods
had been employed, to the direct contradiction of the intent of the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act required that the implementation of
the FACNET system be concentrated on competitive contract awards, a mandate that
necessitated the exchange of information with multiple vendors with whose reputations the
contracting agency may or may not be well-acquainted. This brings up many varied concerns
regarding the sharing of potentially sensitive information, especially since the GAO concluded
that the majority of contracts utilizing FACNET under FASA at the time of the January 1997
report‟s release were awarded through the Department of Defense. According to this GAO letter
report, Department of Defense contracts accounted for about eighty percent of the number and
value of the contracting actions surveyed for the study, which covered 18 federal agencies and
accounted for about ninety percent of all federal acquisitions priced at or below $100,000 and
reported to the Federal Procurement Data System when the study was conducted in the 1995
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fiscal year.

According to the letter report, “[f]ederal officials have stated that FASA's

requirement to focus FACNET's implementation principally on competitive contract awards . . .
may not have been a good approach and has contributed significantly to FACNET's problems,”
which clearly illustrates the problems that arose and detrimental effects that resulted from certain
of FASA‟s requirements. (General Accounting Office, 1997)
Nevertheless, FASA marks a significant point in the government‟s efforts to prevent waste in
federal procurement and shows the government‟s acute awareness of the enormous problem
unethical behavior presents in the U.S. acquisition environment. Without the development of
this legislation, federal acquisitions would not be able to utilize many of the methods of
procurement that are so essential to conducting business in the public sector today.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Tou Hang, Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
75 F.3d 1275. Feb. 7, 1996
One such example of the extent to which ethical breaches penetrated government programs and
operations can be found in the case of United States v. Hang. In a 1996 decision arising out of
the Eighth Circuit, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence handed an
eligibility technician for the Minneapolis Public Housing Authority named Tou Hang, who was,
in September of 1994, indicted for three counts of accepting a bribe as a public official in direct
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A). Hang worked for the Minneapolis Public Housing
Authority, an “independent private corporation organized under Minnesota law and established
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for the purpose of administering federal programs” from January of 1985 until April of 1993, and
though this did not technically classify Hang as an employee of the federal government, his
salary was paid using largely federal money as virtually all the housing authority‟s budget was
comprised of federal funds [75 F3d 1275 (8th Cir. 1994)]. Like other public housing authorities,
Hang‟s employer was responsible for implementation of the Federal Low Income Housing
Program, the purpose of which is to provide federally subsidized housing to low-income
families; the conduction of these operations necessitates that housing authorities comply with
strict regulations, including mandatory budget and expense approval, set forth by the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development, or “HUD” [75 F3d 1275 (8th Cir. 1994)].
Hang‟s position as an eligibility technician required him to determine whether the individuals
who applied for the federally subsidized housing opportunities were eligible according to
federally imposed criteria and if they qualified for any federal or local housing preferences,
allowing for more desirable placement on the waiting list.

Hang screened applications,

confirmed eligibility, and constructed a waiting list, which was typically quite long. His salary
and performance reviews were taken care of by local employees of the housing authority, not the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, a fact which provided the basis for a critical
claim of Hang‟s appeal.
The district court case against Hang alleged that the Laotian native used his bilingual skills to
elicit bribes from Southeast Asian immigrants who had applied for housing through the
Minneapolis Public Housing Authority. Hang had apparently communicated to these individuals
that it was necessary to pay him a bribe in order to secure HUD housing. The government
alleged that on three separate occasions, as represented by the three separate counts of the
indictment, Hang accepted a monetary bribe from an Asian individual in exchange for the
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promise of an accelerated progression through the application process.

The district court

convicted Hang on all three counts and sentenced him to three concurrent thirty-three month
terms of imprisonment, which amounted to the lowest possible prison term allowed by relevant
legislation. The term was calculated by adjusting the base offense level according to the value of
the benefit conferred on the individuals from whom Hang elicited bribes, but was also
lengthened by a sentencing enhancement he earned for obstruction of justice based on evidence
that Hang‟s friends and associates engaged in considerable witness intimidation on his behalf [75
F3d 1275 (8th Cir. 1994)]. Hang‟s contentions upon appeal hinged on two separate theories, one
of which is significantly more germane and has greater implications for the interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 201.
The less relevant contention deals with the district court‟s decision to deny Hang‟s motion
requesting the issuance of several subpoenas for records regarding the mental health and medical
records of witnesses for the prosecution. The Court of Appeals found that the request was a
mere “fishing expedition” and did not merit the intrusion into the personal information of the
witnesses, which left Hang without the evidence he might have used to impeach the credibility of
the witnesses against him. [75 F3d 1275 (8th Cir. 1994)]
More importantly, Hang claims that the issue is a jurisdictional one, for as an employee of the
Minneapolis Public Housing Authority, Hang contended that he was not subject to the same
constraints on ethical behavior as an employee of the federal government. The Court of Appeals
found Hang‟s claims that he was a low-level official without the authority to act on behalf of the
government to be without sufficient merit. To help reach this conclusion, the Court relied on the
Supreme Court‟s 1984 decision in Dixson v. United States to determine that the Congressional
intent underlying 18 U.S.C. § 201 was to “enact a broadly applicable federal bribery statute” that
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should apply to all those who hold a position of public trust [465 U.S. 482, 104 S.Ct. 1172, 79
L.Ed.2d 458 (1984); 75 F3d 1275 (8th Cir. 1994)]. This indicates a willingness to allow for
reasonably broad interpretation of legislation enacted to reduce the negative impacts of ethical
transgressions in government procurement, and illustrates the desire of the federal government to
apply federal ethical standards to private citizens when in the best interest of the United States to
do so. In 1999, United States v. Hang would serve as a precedent in United States v. Kenney,
and along with other cases featuring similar conclusions, United States v. Hang helps to further
the understanding that one need not necessarily be an employee of the federal government to be
subject to the government‟s requirements for ethical behavior [75 F3d 1275 (8th Cir. 1994); [185
F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1999)].

Federal Acquisition Reform Act
Public Law 104-106
Feb. 10, 1996
Further reforms arrived on February 10, 1996, when President Clinton signed into law Public
Law 104-106, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, included in which
was the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996, or FARA.

This legislation represented

government efforts to restructure the acquisition system into a more efficient system in which
procurements could be conducted fairly and without bias. The law was thus intended to have a
major impact on the way the government acquires goods and services, and did so in many ways.
One important provision of FARA pertains to the policy of full and open competition that the
federal government had long since emphasized in its procurements. The terms do not alter those
of the Competition in Contracting Act, but instead merely state that the Federal Acquisition
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Regulation will be responsible for ensuring that this requirement to obtain full and open
competition in acquisitions is implemented in a way “consistent with the need to efficiently
fulfill the Government's requirements” (FARA Title XLI § 4101, 1996). Though this provision
would allow for complete openness in the marketplace, many contractors feared that by
emphasizing the necessity that all contracts be awarded to support the goal of government-wide
efficiency, small businesses who may not be able to compete in terms of price or scheduling may
be left out of certain aspects of the acquisition system where there are significant benefits to
contracting with larger organizations.

Further provisions of FARA detail procedures for

ensuring fairness and efficiency in determining the competitive range and rating proposals under
consideration, as well as provide details regarding pre-award debriefings and the terms under
which an offeror excluded from the competitive range may request such a debriefing. Also,
FARA details an exception to the requirement for the submission of certified cost or pricing data
under the Truth in Negotiations Act in the case of commercial items, but the act does allow the
contractor to reserve the right to require the submission of such information other than certified
cost or pricing data to the extent necessary for the determination of price reasonableness, without
the contractor is not eligible to receive the award. The concept of contracting for commercial
items is again addressed in the next section of the act, where FARA authorizes the FAR to allow
for the application of simplified acquisition procedures for acquisitions priced above the
simplified acquisition threshold but below $5,000,000, if the contracting officer can reasonable
expect, based on the nature of the property or services sought and the market research conducted,
that offers will include none but commercial items (FARA Title XLI § 4202, 1996). The Federal
Acquisition Reform Act thus served as yet another illustration of the federal government‟s desire
to increase efficiency and effectiveness while still promoting fairness within the system. The
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government‟s drive toward reform in the federal acquisition environment is one that has
persisted through numerous efforts at increased simplicity and integrity. (eGov Strategies, 1996)

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. James Lippert, DefendantAppellant
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
148 F.3d 974. Jul. 2, 1998
This drive toward acquisition reform appears also in the continued application of the AntiKickback Act, which allows the United States to attempt to recover some portion of the losses it
incurs as a result of the ethical violations the legislation also strives to prevent. For those
transgressions that do occur in the public sector, the penalties for engaging in unethical activities
such as bribery and kickbacks are clearly defined in the Anti-Kickback Act. There are two
methods by which the government seeks to recoup its losses, both civil and criminal. In some
instances, an individual convicted of anti-kickback violations questions the right of the
government to invoke the civil and criminal penalties prescribed by the statute. In one such case
arising out of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, an individual named James Lippert
brought forth this very issue. Lippert had been the company president of C.B. Forms, L.P., a
company that was under contract to print and supply forms to the United States government
agency the Commodity Credit Corporation, or CCC. While employed at C.B. Forms, Lippert
was proven to have received offers of kickbacks from certain shipping contractors, who then
submitted their invoices to C.B. Forms with the kickback-inflated prices already factored into the
subcontract price. The cost was subsequently transferred to the United States when C.B. Forms
submitted its inflated invoice for payment, as C.B. Forms was reimbursed for shipping costs
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under the terms of the contract. The actual kickbacks were then paid to C.B. Forms, and in some
cases, kickbacks were paid to Lippert himself. The scheme unraveled when the government
learned that one subcontractor was inflating his shipping rates charged to Lippert‟s company so
that other companies were paying up to thirty percent less than C.B. Forms. The sum totals of
bribes paid amounted to $176,411.80, of which C.B. Forms received $140,114.70 and Lippert
received $36,297.10 [148 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 1998)].
In 1993 Lippert plead guilty to a single count of “knowingly and willfully soliciting and
accepting kickbacks in violation of the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986,” which earned him a
criminal fine of $5,000 and an eighteen-month prison sentence [148 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 1998)].
Upon his official criminal conviction, the district court held a sentencing hearing, the purpose of
which was to determine the amount of loss to the United States, and the result of which was an
estimate of between $200,000 and $350,000 [148 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 1998); U.S.S.G. §§
2B4.1(b)(1),2F1.1]. The court arrived at their determination based on several factors, one of
which was the testimony of a procurement officer who asserted that the kickbacks resulted in the
ability of C.B. Forms to lower their bid, knowing that they would make up any losses with the
reimbursable shipping charges [148 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 1998)]. In September of 1994, the United
States filed a claim to seek civil penalties under the Anti-Kickback Act and the False Claims Act,
as well as damages for common law fraud [148 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 1998)]. Civil action was also
sought against C.B. Forms, but the government claims were dismissed when the company filed
for bankruptcy protection.
The court found for the government as to the application of the Anti-Kickback Act, reasoning
that one of the goals of the legislation was to help recover funds lost through kickback schemes,
as was the case with Lippert and C.B. Forms. The court did not, however, feel that it would be
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appropriate to pursue both the Anti-Kickback Act and the False Claims Act as sources of
financial remedy because the two would create a legal redundancy with regards to recovery of
funds. The district court gave a summary judgment due to the defendant‟s conviction under a
guilty plea, and at that time, the court “advised the government that it was entitled to immediate
judgment as a matter of law under the Anti-Kickback Act for double the amount of the
kickbacks, or $352,823.60, or under the False Claims Act for civil penalties totaling $50,000;
alternatively, the government could try its claims for a greater recovery [148 F.3d 974 (8 th Cir.
1998)]. Not surprisingly, the government decided upon the $352,823.60 sum, and, also not
surprisingly, Lippert appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Lippert‟s primary contention and complaint in this case was that his rights were violated under
both the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Excessive Fines Clause. In making their decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court decisions of Hudson
v. United States and United States v. Bajakajian, the former of which “protects only against the
imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense,” and the latter of which
expresses a more conflicted view of how to determine whether a fine is to be counted as punitive
or remedial under the Anti-Kickback Act and other legislation [118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450
(1997); 148 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 1998)].

To determine whether the double jeopardy principle

applies, the court needed to discern that only an extremely clear element of proof is sufficient
when considering whether a civil remedy is so punitive it transforms into a criminal one. In this
case, the court determined that no such proof existed and the Anti-Kickback legislation held no
disproportionately punitive provisions that would cause the act‟s civil penalties to be considered
criminal. Moreover, the court noted the relative leniency of the district court in sentencing
Lippert with only double the kickback cost and not a $10,000 fine for each occurrence of
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prohibited conduct, a provision of the Anti-Kickback Act which is justly viewed as the most
punitive of the civil provisions. In addition to denying his claims of double jeopardy, the Court
of Appeals did not agree with Lippert‟s arguments regarding the imposition of excessive fines,
but instead found that the fines to which Lippert was sentenced were not constitutionally
excessive but instead mere compensatory remedies.
Lippert‟s arguments gave the Court of Appeals a valuable opportunity to articulate the standards
and boundaries for applying the Anti-Kickback Act and, to some extent, the False Claims Act.
Given the enormity of the problem of corruption in government procurement, coupled with the
long span of time over which the nation‟s courts have battled similar issues, bribery and
kickback legislation should have evolved to a relatively stable state. However, the ever-evolving
acquisition environment continually ensures that the legislation developed by Congress and the
opinions composed by the justice system are in need of examination and potential revision,
particularly in such a complex and technology-dependent field as acquisitions. Decisions such as
that in United States v. Lippert thus act as critical measures of evaluation for current legislation
and help serve as a benchmark for those in positions of authority and responsibility.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Ronnie Brunson Kenney,
Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
185 F.2d 1217. Aug. 26, 1999
The issue of just who is defined as occupying such positions of authority and responsibility
arises again in the case of United States v. Kenney. In June 1997, Ronnie Brunson Kenney was

56

named in an indictment filed with the United States District Court for the Panama City Division
of the Northern District of Florida. The indictment listed three separate counts of soliciting a
bribe as a public official, each of which referenced some form of kickback, gratuity, or bribe.
The first count of the indictment referred to a solicitation of a kickback for a contract change
regarding substitution of materials, the second referred to a more general promise of favorable
treatment made to a contractor in exchange for gratuity payments, and the third referred to a
solicited bribe in exchange for a change in contract specifications describing shipment materials.
All alleged violations were committed by Kenney during his term as Acquisition Manager on a
contract Florida‟s Tyndall Air Force Base awarded to Starflite Boats. As per the contract,
Starflite agreed to provide edge markers on combat zone airfields as a mechanism for
illuminating damage as part of the Air Force‟s runway repair program. While Kenney was
operating in a position of apparent authority, he was in fact, not a government employee, but an
employee of BDM International, Inc., a large public corporation that was under contract with the
United States Air Force to provide systems integration support to supplement Air Force
functions. Though his salary was paid by BDM and not the United States Air Force, the funds
used were proven at trial to stem directly from receipts of payment from the government in
return for the services provided under BDM‟s contract.
On August 29, 1997, the jury found Kenney guilty of the lesser included offense of soliciting a
gratuity under the first and third counts of the indictment, but returned a verdict of not guilty as
to the second, less specific, count of the indictment. Kenney filed an appeal with the United
States Court of Appeals of the 11th Circuit, in which he alleged errors in the pre-indictment
delay and the government‟s failure to offer sufficient proof of the allegations at indictment, both
of which claims were dismissed as without merit by the Court of Appeals. However, the court
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did agree to debate the merits of Kenney‟s most critical enumeration of error, whereby he
asserted that the district court should not have denied his motion to dismiss as he was not a
“public official” as defined by the statute codified in 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(1)(B), under which
Kenney was convicted by the trial court. This statute states that a “public official” may not
“demand, seek or accept anything of value in return for being influenced in an official act” (185
F.2d 1217 11th Cir. 1999). The statute also disallows public officials from seeking, receiving, or
accepting anything of value for or because of an official act performed or to be performed,
meaning that an official need not accept a gratuity payment or bribe but only conspire to do so in
order to violate the statute (185 F.2d 1217 11th Cir. 1999). See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(1)(B). Under
18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1), the term public official is specifically defined as follows:
Member of Congress, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, either before or after
such official has qualified, or an officer or employee or person acting for or on
behalf of the United States, or any department, agency, or branch of Government
thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by
authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror.
(185 F.2d 1217 11th Cir. 1999)
Kenney claimed that his employment by a non-governmental organization classified him as a
private citizen rather than a public official, yet the district court agreed with the government‟s
assertion that Kenney occupied a “position of public trust with official federal responsibilities”
(185 F.2d 1217 11th Cir. 1999). Although Kenney contended that he was not authorized to alter
the contract or bind the government in acquisition matters, the district court relied on the
precedents of United States v. Hang among others to conclude that a defendant need not have
final decisive power as to federal programs or policies, but instead need only to be in “a position
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of providing information and making recommendations to decision makers as long as the
defendant‟s input is given sufficient weight to influence the outcomes of the decision at issue”
(185 F.2d 1217 11th Cir. 1999). Because trial testimony proved that Kenney did hold a position
of public trust due to the Air Force‟s reliance on his advice, the appellate court found sufficient
evidence that Kenney‟s job required him to function as the primary contractor liaison in
Starflite‟s Air Force contract and that he thus possessed some measure of federal responsibility.
Kenney‟s position placed him in the role of technical advisor to the acquisition, and his status as
Acquisition Manager demanded that he perform federal duties as well as serve non-governmental
functions. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the denial of Kenney‟s motion to dismiss on
the basis that he was, in fact, acting as a public official at the time of his offenses. Furthermore,
the appellate court spent considerable energy debating the validity of the jury instructions given
at trial, which, in relevant part, stated that:
A “public official”. . . is any person who acts for or on behalf of the United States,
that is, a person who possesses some degree of official responsibility for carrying
out a federal program or policy . . . who . . . either (a) makes official
governmental decisions . . . or (b) makes recommendations regarding official
governmental decisions, or (c) processes or evaluates information for use by
others in the making of official governmental decisions . . . . A “public official”
need not be an employee of the federal government or of any government at all; a
person who acts for or on behalf of the federal government pursuant to a contract
or other business relationship can be a “public official”. . . . The term . . . thus
includes an employee of a private corporation who acts for or on behalf of the
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federal government pursuant to a contract. (Record Excerpt 26 at 10, 185 F.2d
1217 11th Cir. 1999)
Kenney attempted to claim that the instructions were “vague, open-ended, and left the jury no
choice but to find him a public official,” and thus return a conviction (185 F.2d 1217 11th Cir.
1999). Yet again, the appellate court found for the government and affirmed the findings of the
trial court. While this decision was in full agreement with the district court on the meaning of
the term “public official,” the court of appeals did find the jury instructions somewhat less than
precise by the court‟s own standards (185 F.2d 1217 11th Cir. 1999).
This case illustrates an important point in the development of acquisition culture in the United
States. The nation has moved from a system in which contractors maintained distant and
egocentric relationships with the government to a more cooperative system in which contractors
can collaborate with the government, sharing information and engaging in the co-development of
project strategy in an effort to increase quality and productivity. This closing of the gap between
the government and the private sector is evident in United States v. Kenney in the discussion of
the inclusion of contractor employees in the definition of “public official.” Cases like these, in
which a nongovernmental employee is also held to the ethical standards required of those in
government, illustrate just how much the line between public and private can be blurred in a
changing acquisition environment.

Commissions, Committees, and Reviews
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century and now into the twenty-first, the federal
government has attempted to improve the levels of economy, efficiency, and accountability in
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various agencies and programs, and a primary catalyst for many of these improvement initiatives
has arrived in the form of a federal commission, committee, or review. Named for its chairman,
former President Herbert Hoover, the first of the two legendary Hoover Commissions began its
work in 1949, and focused its attention on the defense management process, concluding that the
rigidity created by the National Security Act of 1947 did not help unify the process as hoped.
The commission also concluded that waste and inefficiency were abundantly present in the
system, and that the implementation of the more centralized system of control that was so
favored in the years directly following World War II was a major contributing factor to that level
of inefficiency. Though the commission‟s reports received widespread support, many of their
recommendations were not implemented for years. In 1953 President Eisenhower established
the President‟s Advisory Committee on Government Organization, and assigned as its chairman
Nelson Rockefeller.

The Rockefeller Committee focused on the need to achieve greater

economy and efficiency as well, recommending changes that would produce more “effective
DoD planning and civilian control” (Reeves, 1996, 14). Like the Hoover Commission, the
Rockefeller Committee found that the Department of Defense, though more centralized and
structured, did not achieve the level of unity and cohesiveness that was desired. The Rockefeller
Committee recommended the elimination of such entities as the Munitions Board, the Research
and Development Board, and the Defense Supply Management Agency and Office of Director of
Installations, all to be replaced by six assistant secretaries of defense to act in an advisory
capacity to the Secretary. The Rockefeller Commission was largely successful in garnering
support for their recommendations, getting approval from both President Eisenhower and
Congress to pass Public Law 88-3 in 1953 (Reeves, 1996, 14). However, within mere days of
President Eisenhower‟s approval of the Rockefeller Committee reorganization plans, Congress
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took its own step toward reform with the establishment of a new Commission on Organization of
the Executive Branch, which was again chaired by former President Hoover. While this second
Hoover Commission did work toward improving economy and efficiency and preventing fraud,
waste, and abuse across the agencies of the executive branch, the majority of the focus was again
directed at the Department of Defense, due to the simple fact that the Department of Defense‟s
budget accounted for approximately three-fifths that of the federal government at the time
(Reeves, 1996, 14). With a broader Congressional charter than the first Hoover Commission,
Hoover II was able to make bolder policy recommendations, such as those that would serve to
reduce government direct business operations, and in the case of the Department of Defense,
reorganize the arsenal system. With Eisenhower still in the White House, the executive branch
mounted a counterassault against this reorganization in the form of increased competition and
commercialization in the arsenal system, which served to forestall further action by Congress on
that issue. Nonetheless, the second Hoover commission was largely successful in attaining
approval for its recommendations, as is evidenced by the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958, in
which the government yet again turned its focus toward efficiency, though the commission did
not meet their goal of further addressing the management of contemporary acquisition issues.
Perhaps one of the most important recommendations of the commission was that regarding the
federal government‟s concern that conflict of interest laws may have a dissuasive impact on
private sector employees who might otherwise become qualified candidates for insertion into
government service vacancies. Thus, the commission recommended relaxing the conflict of
interest laws for certain categories of senior government personnel. The commission believed
this recommendation would make great strides in making government service seem like a more
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acceptable option to many private sector employees, but Congress, rather uncooperatively,
denied the recommendation and instead instituted even stricter legislation. (Reeves, 1996, 10-15)
In July of 1969, President Nixon appointed Gilbert Fitzhugh to chair the Blue Ribbon Defense
Panel, or what has since become known as the Fitzhugh Commission. The first major study to
specifically focus on defense acquisition reform, the Fitzhugh Commission was a systemic
evaluation of defense acquisition practices that ultimately concluded the system was plagued by
a set of interrelated issues that desperately required the implementation of both organizational
and procedural changes (Reeves, 1996, 16). The committee differed notably from the views of
past commissions, which favored centralization, and instead found that such centralization and
management layering, along with the large span of control enjoyed by the Secretary of Defense,
had contributed to major problems with costs, scheduling, and performance. The commission
fought many of the defense acquisition business practices instituted under Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamera beginning in 1961, all concentrated on the idea of excessive centralization in
the Department of Defense. The commission did favor, however, such strategies as the use of
flexible acquisition methods, incrementally developing subsystems, professional development
for acquisition personnel, multiple decision points for use in program developments, and
increased testing during acquisitions (Reeves, 1996, 16).

The commission and its

recommendations were quite well-received by the Department of Defense at the time, and
although the Department (instead of Congress) was given the responsibility for seeing the
changes realized, few were actually implemented, leaving the next Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management under David Packard to basically repeat the findings of the Fitzhugh
Report. With respect to the other executive agencies, procurement issues were investigated
beginning in November of 1969 by Congress‟s Commission on Government Procurement. The
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commission noted a lack of uniformity among federal agencies and questioned the ability of such
a system to provide any suitable measure of efficiency. This commission, like others before it,
noted the waves of paperwork that seemed to overwhelm the process and the complicated
regulations that seemed to do nothing except get in the way of productivity. The lack of a
unified policy meant that, when the need for guidance arose, the Department of Defense
dominated that lead.

In 1974, Congress implemented the Commission on Government

Procurement‟s recommendation to create the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to establish a
single, unified source of guidance to simplify the procurement process. Like the Fitzhugh
Commission, the Commission on Government Procurement concluded the following:
competitive negotiated contracts should be the preferred approach in comparison to formal
advertising, multi-year contracts should be used to greater advantage, acquisition personnel
should receive more professional development opportunities, small-purchase and socioeconomic
thresholds should be raised, competition should be strongly emphasized in all areas of
acquisitions, an independent operational test and evaluation activity should be established, and
more authority for program decisions should be delegated. Interestingly, a 1980 study conducted
by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to determine the OFPP‟s level of success at
effectively unifying the federal procurement process determined that there still existed a
considerable amount of complexity and confusion. Two years later, a n OFPP follow-on report
noted the adversarial relationship that existed between the government and its suppliers, and
blamed the oppositional atmosphere on the “cumbersome, costly and frustrating [procurement
process that led] to less competition and erosion of the industrial base” and the lack of adequate
professional development programs for the professional workforce (Reeves, 1996, 19). The
information collected by the OFPP had a dramatic effect on the future of the acquisition
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environment, beginning with Congress‟s passage of the Federal Acquisition Regulation System
in 1980, through which it intended to reduce and standardize federal procurement regulations.
The initial and subsequent OFPP reports, combined with the changes implemented by the new
Federal Acquisition Regulation System, were major factors in the passage of the Competition in
Contracting Act in 1984 to “encourage greater industry participation in government
procurements” (Reeves, 1996, 19). (Reeves, 1996, 16-19)
In 1982, President Reagan attempted to follow through on a campaign promise to reduce
“outright fraud” as well as other waste and abuse in the federal budget, lowering costs by two
percent. He sought to do this through the establishment of the President‟s Private Sector Survey
on Cost Control, whose chairman position was to be filled by J. Peter Grace. This commission
rapidly arrived at the decision that the government could save $424 billion just by engaging in
sound business practices, and issued a set of 2, 478 recommendations for the government to
consider for implementation, though not one of those recommendations included the elimination
of a federal government program. The Grace Commission, like nearly every other such body,
noted the need for reform within the Department of Defense, but here, the Grace Commission
determined that the government‟s acquisition functions would be most efficiently coordinated
when centralized under a single Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, creating a
“streamlining approach” that would have much greater influence in the remainder of the 1980s
and into the 1990s (Reeves, 1996, 20). While the commission strongly recommended this idea
of a consolidated procurement and contract administration agency in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, they met with little Congressional support, due primarily to the fact that the Grace
Commission was very vocal about blaming Congress for contributing to the problems in the
defense acquisition process. Nevertheless, some of the commission‟s recommendations, such as
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“decreasing the use of military specifications, repealing or amending selected socioeconomic
laws, and increasing the use of multi-year contracts” proved to be important to the acquisition
system long after the commission disbanded, though they went largely unnoticed at the time of
issue (Reeves, 1996, 21). (Reeves, 1996, 20-21)
What did garner attention was the discovery of instances of contractor fraud within the
department of defense. The highly publicized cases involving “$400 hammers, $500 toilet seats,
and $700 coffee pots” occurred during an intense period of growth for the Department of
Defense, with the DoD‟s budget growing by forty percent between 1980 and 1985. By time May
of 1985 arrived, the Department had 131 investigations pending against 45 of its 100 largest
contractors (Reeves, 1996, 21). This startling situation is the partly the result of years of
procedural and organizational problems within the Department of Defense and other executive
branch agencies, all exaggerated by the rapid growth and expansion of the 1980s. President
Reagan attempted to systematically evaluate the DoD in such areas as “defense acquisition,
organization and decision-making, Congressional oversight, and the national command
structure” through the charter of a new commission under former Secretary of Defense David
Packard (Reeves, 1996, 21). This Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management focused
on developing a model on which to base the defense acquisition system, and they relied heavily
on the management solutions set forth

in private-sector business books, including “clear

command channels, stability, limited reporting requirements, small quality staffs, dialogue with
customers (end users), and prototyping and testing” (Reeves, 1996, 21). Like past commissions,
such as that chaired by Fitzhugh, their recommendations on reorganization and best practices did
not receive widespread support, yet many of the Packard Commission‟s recommendations were
implemented in the next decade. Such recommendations as the creation of an Under Secretary of
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Defense for Acquisition; establishment of service acquisition executives; creation of program
executive officers; recodification of federal law into a single, consistent, simplified procurement
statute; and increased utilization of commercial products through the elimination of military
specifications have all had a major impact on the acquisition environment, and were all the result
of recommendations made by Presidential and Congressional commissions and committees
(Reeves, 1996, 22). Also, as so many of the commissions and committees found fault with the
system of professional development for acquisition personnel, Congress finally moved forward
to establish the Federal Acquisition Institute in 1993 so that the workforce may not only be
improved but maintained as well. The early 1990s brought about heightened tension in Congress
about the inefficiencies still lurking in defense procurement processes. As a result, in 1991,
Section 800 of the Fiscal Year 1991 DoD Authorization Act directed the Department of Defense
to establish the Acquisition Law Advisory Panel. Using a similar pattern to that of the Packard
Commission, this panel was intended to conduct a review of the acquisition legislation that
governs DoD procedures, processes, and policies and determine whether certain laws should be
repealed or amended (Reeves, 1996, 22).

The result was an 1,800 page report reviewing

approximately 600 different laws, within which the panel recommended such measures as the
establishment of simplified acquisition procedures for procurements valued under $100,000, as
well as legislation allowing for the Department of Defense to act as a commercial purchaser, new
thresholds pertaining to various socioeconomic programs, and the elimination of requirements
under the Truth in Negotiation Act that necessitated the submission of cost or pricing data for
procurements valued at less than $500,000 (Reeves, 1996, 22).
These recommendations, too, found their way into the national consciousness, particularly within
the Clinton Administration‟s 1993 National Performance Review and the subsequent Federal
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Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. The 1993 National Performance Review instituted by
Vice President Gore came at a critical point in time, for with the end of the Cold War, the threats
to U.S. national security changed, and the defense budget decreased by more than 41% from the
1985 peak to the year 1997 (Reeves, 1996, 23). Yet, although the review came at one of the
most significant sea changes in the history of the U.S. acquisition environment, many of the
recommended changes meant to fundamentally alter and improve the Department of Defense and
other programs were, in fact, echoes of the recommendations of earlier committees and
commissions. The review concluded that the DoD should adopt businesslike procedures with an
emphasis on maintaining the industrial base and increasing the use of commercial item
contracting. Like its predecessors, the review also recommended the elimination of military
specifications, and the streamlining and simplification of procurement processes whenever
possible. The review did have one seemingly original idea in the establishment of defense
acquisition pilot programs, which were intended to “test whether or not efficiencies could be
achieved from using standard, commercial industrial practices to procure defense goods and
services” and enjoyed widespread implementation in 1994 through FASA‟s authorization of
thirteen government-wide pilot programs (Reeves, 1996, 23). (Reeves, 1996, 16-24)
Taken in sum, the commissions, committees, and reviews of the latter half of the twentieth
century provide a nearly continuous stream of ultimately similar concerns and conclusions. With
a strict focus on promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and reducing fraud, waste,
abuse, and misrepresentation in federal government procurement, these groups have all had ideas
in common. The differences lie in the Presidential administration in office and body of Congress
in session at the time each commission or committee conducted its research and issued its
findings. Taking into account the national political and socioeconomic considerations that affect
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the passage of legislation and the promulgation of regulations, it is clear that many of these
recommendations, if properly implemented, would have precluded the need for the prescription
of these policies by later commissions.

Prevention of Ethical Violations and Recommendations for Future Action
The U.S. Department of Justice is a primary resource for information about the prevention of
fraudulent activities in government procurement. On October 10, 2006, the Assistant Attorney
General‟s Office at the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice released a report entitled
“Combating Procurement Fraud: A National Initiative to Increase Prevention and Prosecution of
Fraud in the Federal Procurement Process” (United States Department of Justice, 2010). The
Department of Justice has charged the National Procurement Fraud Initiative with the “early
detection, prevention, and prosecution of procurement fraud” that is inevitably present in the
system (United States Department of Justice, 2010, 1). Among the most important goals set for
the task force are those that demand increased criminal enforcement in the areas of “ethics and
conflict of interest violations, and public corruption associated with procurement fraud,” and the
focus is to be placed on the training of law enforcement agents and procurement specialists in the
areas of fraud detection and investigation (United States Department of Justice, 2010, 1-2).
Also, in addition to the Fraud Section of the Civil Division that this National Procurement Fraud
Initiative has established to manage the civil recovery aspects of procurement fraud cases, there
is a separate Fraud Section of the Criminal Division to manage the criminal side of these cases.
There are several key prosecutorial resources that the Department of Justice utilizes in carrying
out the tasks of the National Procurement Fraud Initiative. The Criminal Division‟s Fraud
Section is known for its close working relationship to the Department of Defense Inspector
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General (DoD-IG), as well as the IG community as a whole. As an active and vital member of
the DoD-IG‟s existing Procurement Fraud Working Group, the Fraud Section helps train
investigators on the prevention and detection of procurement fraud.

With a multitude of

experience dealing with the legal elements of procurement fraud, the Fraud Section often assists
United States Attorneys‟ Offices in the prosecution of their cases. The Department of Justice‟s
Public Integrity Section (PIN) is also a major asset to the Initiative. The Public Integrity Section
focuses on public corruption, and has developed a high level of expertise. This section of the
Criminal Division is closely affiliated with the Offices of Inspector General (OIGs), and in 2002,
the relationship further solidified when the PIN assigned trial attorneys to liaise with each major
OIG and advise on prosecutor, evidentiary, and law enforcement matters. The Criminal Division
also contains another critical section, the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section
(AFMLS). This section serves to supply seizure warrants to investigators of procurement fraud
so that the tasks of the initiative may be carried out quickly and effectively to minimize the loss
of taxpayer funds or substitution of inferior goods and services. Perhaps a more critical function
of this section lies in its duties regarding the forfeiture remedies available under federal law. The
AFMLS works diligently alongside trial attorneys to advise in the prosecution of these
procurement fraud cases. The Civil Division‟s Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section, is
the section charged with the recovery of the losses that federal agencies incur as a result of
procurement fraud. The Fraud Section works with the United States Attorneys‟ Offices to
enforce the False Claims Act, federal statutes like those condemning the bribery of a public
official at 18 U.S.C. § 201, and common law remedies established through judicial precedent.
Types of procurement fraud ranging from overcharging and defective pricing under TINA, to
quality deficiencies and product substitution, to bribery and corruption of public officials are all
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enforced by the Fraud Section of the Department of Justice‟s Civil Division. With the aid of the
many investigative agencies with whom all sections work closely, the Civil Division has
recovered over three billion dollars in DoD procurement fraud losses since 1986, and continues
to add to that figure. (United States Department of Justice, 2010, 1-4)
The National Procurement Fraud Task force has established a series of key goals that it believes
will make it more effective and efficient as a combatant of procurement fraud. These priorities
are outlined below:
1.

Identification and prosecution of viable procurement fraud cases through
coordination with United States Attorneys‟ Offices, IG field Offices, and
the regional procurement fraud working groups . . . ;

2.

Ensuring adequate resources are available to successfully investigate and
prosecute procurement fraud cases;

3.

Standardization of “best practices” (e.g., recruitment of sources,
consensual calls, and witness interviews);

4.

Better coordination between agency auditors and investigators to ensure
that red flags and badges of fraud are promptly reported to criminal
investigators for follow-up investigation;

5.

Better identification and resolution of investigative and coordination
issues as they arise in joint cases (e.g., audit support and expanded efforts
to share information);

6.

Specialized training for OIG agents and auditors on the investigation and
prosecution of procurement fraud cases;

71

7.

Examination of existing laws and policies, including conflict of interest
laws and voluntary disclosure policies, to determine if they need
strengthening or change;

8.

Development of strategies to encourage agencies, auditors and contracting
officers to refer more cases for criminal and civil prosecution; and

9.

Better coordination of targeted civil, regulatory and criminal enforcement
actions. (United States Department of Justice, 2010, 5-6)

The above elements are being pursued by the National Procurement Fraud Task Force at present,
with many positive outcomes. The methods and strategies used to produce these results are thus
advisable as a course of action for any government agency or program that deals with fraud and
corruption, as all do at some point in the conduct of their activities. Some of the most effective
among the strategies adopted by Task Force participants are as follows:
1.

Collaboration between federal agents and government contractors to
educate them on effective means for preventing fraud, waste and abuse;

2.

Collaboration between special agents and prosecutors at early stages of
procurement fraud investigations to ensure successful prosecutions and
civil recoveries;

3.

Education of government contracting officers, program managers and
other agency personnel on issues relating to the detection and prevention
of procurement fraud;

4.

Placement of agency investigators at major procurement offices to work
with agency employees who are directly involved in negotiating
government contracts;
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5.

Use of computer data-mining and other programs to uncover and detect
procurement fraud; and

6.

Enhanced efforts to detect ethics violations and conflicts of interest by
current and former agency officials. (United States Department of Justice,
2010, 6)

With these strategies proven to increase the National Procurement Fraud Task Force‟s ability to
prevent and prosecute procurement fraud, the acquisition community can employ similar
measures across the board. As part of the purpose of public prosecutions is to act as a deterrent
to the commission of fraudulent activity in federal procurement, increased prosecutorial
efficiency brought about by increased communication and collaboration among the Department
of Justice and various agencies is key to the prevention of ethical violations in public
procurement. Equally important are measures such as training and education, however, and the
National Procurement Fraud Initiative represents a recognition of the impact that a well-trained
acquisition workforce can have on the acquisition environment‟s level of ethical compliance.
Another excellent example of an organization committed to the prevention of ethical violations is
the Defense Industry Initiative, or DII. The DII was formed in July of 1986 when Jack Welch,
the CEO of General Electric, and the CEOs and senior officials of seventeen other defense
contractors voluntarily met and created the Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and
Conduct, a set of principles that were then adopted by thirty-two major defense contractors,
including such industrial titans as The Boeing Company, General Dynamics Company,
Lockheed Corporation, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, and Raytheon Company. The DII was
established largely in response to the February 1986 Interim Report of the Packard Commission
(The President‟s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management), which noted the high level
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of fraud, waste, and abuse in the system and called for widespread improvement in the defense
industry‟s level of self-governance. The Packard Commission would serve as a significant
source of direction and guidance for the DII, with the organization‟s principles appearing in the
Appendix of the Packard Commission‟s June 1986 report to the President entitled, “A Quest for
Excellence.” The original principles have been in use continually since the time of issue, and are
outlined below:
1.

Have and adhere to written Codes of Conduct;

2.

Train employees in those codes;

3.

Encourage internal reporting of violations of the Code, within an
atmosphere free of fear of retribution;

4.

Practice self-governance through the implementation of systems to
monitor compliance with federal procurement laws and the adoption of
procedures for voluntary disclosure of violations to the appropriate
authorities;

5.

Share with other firms their best practices in implementing the principles,
and participate annually in “Best practices Forums;‟ and

6.

Be accountable to the public. (Defense Industry Initiative on Business
Ethics and Conduct, 2010)

The DII explicitly states that “DII members, and the CEOs of every DII company, must abide by
DII‟s core principles,” indicating the organization‟s sincere commitment to ensuring compliance
with compliance, and instilling a passion for the prevention of ethical violations within each of
its signatory contractors (Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct, 2010). By
becoming a signatory member of the DII, companies are required to affirm the following:
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We, the members of the Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics &
Conduct (DII), affirm our commitment to uphold the highest ethical standards in
all our business dealings with the government, as expressed through the following
principles:
1.

We shall act honestly in all business dealings with the U.S. government,
protect taxpayer resources and provide high-quality products and services
for the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces.

2.

We shall promote the highest ethical values as expressed in our written
codes of business conduct, nurture an ethical culture through
communications, training, and other means, and comply with and honor
all governing laws and regulations.

3.

We shall establish and sustain effective business ethics and compliance
programs that reflect our commitment to self-governance, and shall
encourage employees to report suspected misconduct, forbid retaliation for
such reporting, and ensure the existence of a process for mandatory and
voluntary disclosures of violations of relevant laws and regulations.

4.

We shall share best practices with respect to business ethics and
compliance, and participate in the annual DII Best Practices Forum.

5.

We shall be accountable to the public, through regular reporting by DII to
Congress and the public. These reports will describe members‟ efforts to
build and sustain a strong culture of business ethics and compliance.
(Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct, 2010)
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The DII is significant in that it represents a highly prominent example of private industry taking
the steps to implement strict ethics programs within contractors‟ organizations.

This

commitment to integrity in government contracting, long before regulations mandated the
implementation of such ethics codes and programs, illustrates the potential for increased
compliance with ethical standards in the acquisition environment.
There are ethics program standards and requirements for contractors outlined in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation.

Though specific ethical requirements are not prescribed so that

contractors may create their own appropriate ethics compliance systems, the FAR Council has
established a firm framework for institutional ethics management and disclosure. Required
components for federal contractors include: a code of business ethics and conduct, an ethics
awareness and compliance program, an internal control system, a high level of management
oversight, periodic reviews and/or audits, an internal mechanism for reporting misconduct,
disciplinary systems, and timely disclosure of violations (FAR 3.1002-1003; 52.203-13; 73 Fed.
Reg. 67064-93 (Nov. 12. 2008)).

However, mere compliance with the basic government

standards is unlikely to create a successful system of ethical prevention. A contractor must take
steps to ensure the total commitment of management to ethical compliance at all levels of the
organization, from corporate to business to functional.
Perhaps the world‟s leader in ethical compliance is the Ethics and Compliance Officer
Association, or ECOA.

The ECOA is a nonprofit, 501(c)(6), “member-driven association

exclusively for individuals responsible for their organization‟s ethics, compliance, and business
conduct programs (Ethics and Compliance Officer Association). With the largest group of ethics
and compliance practitioners in the world as its membership body, it is the only organization of
its kind and is credited with the formal founding of the field of ethics and compliance when the
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ECOA was founded (initially as the Ethics Officer Association) in 1991. When the ECOA was
initially incorporated, nineteen companies signed on as ECOA “Sponsoring Partner” members,
including such companies as Northrop, Raytheon, Westinghouse Hanford, Texas Instrument,
Honeywell, and the Internal Revenue Service. By the end of 1992, after the ECOA officially
filed for status as a 501(c)(6) corporation, the group had grown to twenty-five companies and
included McDonnel Douglas, Allied Signal, American Express, Dun & Bradstreet, Teledyne, and
Northern Telecom. The organization works to bring together the knowledge bases of those with
varying degrees of experience in the field, and attempts to help practicing ethics and compliance
officers address the issues they face in the workplace. The organization leverages its global
commitment to ethics and integrity in business as well as the diversity and collegiality of its
members and its trusting and open environment to create a network of core competencies in the
prevention of ethical violations that has had a substantial impact on the growth of the field. Like
the DII, the ECOA has developed a set of Standards of Conduct for Ethics and Compliance
Practitioners, including a list of responsibilities to the organization and to the field. The ECOA‟s
recommendations for ethical standards are listed below:
Responsibilities to [the] Employing Organization:
1.

Be a role model in adhering to my employer‟s code of conduct.

2.

Proactively advocate the integration of ethical organizational practices and
a commitment to compliance into all aspects of my employer‟s business.

3.

Ensure to the best of my abilities that my employer upholds all relevant
laws and regulations wherever it conducts business.
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4.

Be a leader in the formation of ethical organizational practices in support
of evolving organizational strategies and opportunities, taking into
consideration legal requirements, customs, and best practices.

5.

Raise and escalate, as necessary, significant organizational ethics and
compliance issues.

6.

Protect confidential information obtained in the course of my professional
activities unless disclosure of such information is required by law,
applicable regulation, or company policy, or if maintaining the
confidentiality of such information would create an appreciable health or
safety risk.

7.

Avoid any actual, potential, or perceived conflicts between my personal
and organizational responsibilities, and promptly disclose and resolve any
issues that may arise.

Responsibilities to the Field:
1.

Maintain exemplary standards of personal and professional integrity.

2.

Strive to continually advance my knowledge of organizational ethics and
compliance.

3.

Work both individually and collectively with other members of the ethics
and compliance field to advance the development of organizational ethics
and compliance.
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4.

Take advantage of opportunities to improve public understanding of
organizational ethics and compliance and their importance to sound
organization management. (Ethics and Compliance Officer Association)

Developed by the Ethics Subcommittee of the ECOA Board of Directors, the ethics standards
above are periodically revised to provide the public with the most current best practices
available. The ECOA standards “reflect a recognition of responsibilities to the practitioner‟s
employer, to the field itself, and thus to the public at large” (Ethics and Compliance Officer
Association). The standards are meant to educate ethics and compliance officers as well as the
workforce at large, in an effort to take ethical compliance beyond the bounds and requirements
of law and illustrate the positive impact of increased ethical compliance across all industries.

Conclusions
At present, the acquisition system would seem to present a very different face from that of early
Cold War America. Technology has revolutionized the procurement process, and many of the
hierarchies and organizational structures of the last half-century are nearly unrecognizable today.
But the one thing that remains ever-present is the existence of fraud in the acquisition system.
Despite the numerous legislative, executive, and judicial attempts to establish punitive and
preventative measures, the system is simply too large, too complex, and too easy to defraud.
While the Department of Justice through the National Procurement Fraud Initiative and the
National Procurement Fraud Task Force is working diligently alongside countless federal
investigators and prosecutors, the corruption that has plagued the U.S. acquisition system since
its inception is still a significant threat, and one that is not likely to abate. Without increased
ethics training and education for government personnel and contractors, as well as further
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improvements to systems of fraud detection, even the most eloquently composed legislation will
remain only partially effective. Through greater cooperation among the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches, it is possible to work toward more effective implementation of statutory
and regulatory provisions regarding ethical behavior in government contracting. This increase in
the effectiveness of ethics legislation, regulations, and case law, combined with an increase in
ethics compliance training and guidance, has the potential to create a system in which
accountability is a prerequisite for the operation of any government program or agency.
The issue is not whether it is possible to eradicate all ethical noncompliance from the
procurement process. In fact, this will never be a realizable possibility. Instead, the issue is
simply that it is imperative the system continue to constantly monitor, evaluate, and improve
upon the methods of preventing ethical breaches in government contracting. The concept of
public trust, though meant to apply to individual action, is also applicable here to the federal
government in its entirety, and can only be preserved when integrity and ethicality are as well.
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